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CREATING A MORE MEANINGFUL
DETENTION STATUTE: LESSONS LEARNED
FROM HEDGES V. OBAMA
Colby P. Horowitz*
In 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the President’s power to
indefinitely detain members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Nearly ten years
later, however, the substantive parameters of executive detention remain
unclear. Post-9/11 detention law has been largely shaped by the lower
federal courts on a case-by-case basis as they evaluate habeas corpus
petitions from detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. In 2012, as part of the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress attempted, for the
first time, to codify a substantive detention standard in section 1021.
Instead of providing clarity, however, section 1021 contained ambiguous
terms and created more confusion. On January 13, 2012, a group of
writers and activists led by Pulitzer Prize winning–journalist Christopher
Hedges challenged this detention law in the Southern District of New York.
They argued that section 1021 was vague and might allow for detention
based on protected First Amendment activities. In Hedges v. Obama, Judge
Katherine Forrest held that a key portion of section 1021 was
unconstitutional and permanently enjoined it. That injunction has since
been stayed, and the case is currently on appeal in the Second Circuit.
This Notes argues that congressional legislation is essential to define and
limit the executive’s detention authority but that section 1021 of the NDAA
failed to achieve this purpose. The Note provides recommendations for
how to create a more meaningful detention statute that imposes clear
substantive limits on executive authority. A congressional detention statute
with clearly articulated definitions and concepts will not only provide
guidance to the President, it will also provide the courts with a coherent
standard to use when evaluating the legality of specific detentions.
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INTRODUCTION
Challenges to executive detention normally come from detainees, and
usually in the form of habeas corpus petitions.1 But on January 13, 2012, a
group of writers and activists decided to preemptively challenge the scope
of indefinite executive detention.2 They specifically sought to enjoin
section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
20123 (NDAA), claiming that this section violated their free speech,
associational, and due process rights. The plaintiffs feared that, even as
U.S. citizens, they might be locked away or sent to Guantanamo Bay for
exercising their free speech rights or engaging in political advocacy.
In section 1021 of the NDAA, Congress codified and affirmed the
executive branch’s detention authority for terrorist suspects.4 This authority
had previously derived from the Authorization for Use of Military Force of
20015 (AUMF), which was over ten years old and made no specific
mention of detention. Instead of providing clarity, however, the scope of
the authority granted by section 1021 is uncertain. On September 12, 2012,
Judge Katherine B. Forrest of the Southern District of New York ruled in
favor of the writers and activists and permanently enjoined a key portion of
section 1021, holding that it violated both the First and Fifth Amendments
of the Constitution.6
Congressional legislation is essential to define and limit the executive’s
detention authority, but section 1021 of the NDAA has failed to achieve this
purpose. This Note examines ambiguities and uncertainties in current
detention law and recommends ways to create a more meaningful detention

1. See Sonia R. Farber, Comment, Forgotten at Guantanamo: The Boumediene
Decision and Its Implications for Refugees at the Base Under the Obama Administration, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 989, 1006–07 (2010) (highlighting the “flood of litigation” on behalf of
detainees starting in 2008); see also infra note 85 and accompanying text.
2. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 1721124 (S.D.N.Y. May 16,
2012) (order granting preliminary injunction).
3. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011).
4. Section 1021 of the NDAA is titled “Affirmation of Authority of the Armed Forces
of the United States to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of
Military Force.” Id. § 1021, 125 Stat. at 1562.
5. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).
6. See Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 3999839 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
12, 2012). The Second Circuit has subsequently granted a stay of Judge Forrest’s injunction
until it decides the case on appeal. See Court Upholds NDAA; Stay Extended on Indefinite
Detention Injunction, RT (Oct. 3, 2012, 7:43PM), http://rt.com/usa/news/appeals-ndaadetention-public-536/.
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statute. Part I focuses on the AUMF, the four major post-9/11 Supreme
Court decisions regarding executive detention, and the 2012 NDAA. Part I
also establishes a framework for evaluating the separation of powers
between Congress and the President on national security issues using the
Supreme Court’s famous decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer.7 Part II examines how the D.C. District and Circuit Courts
struggled to define important detention terms during the flood of habeas
corpus litigation coming from Guantanamo Bay after 2008. These terms
were eventually codified in section 1021 of the NDAA. Part III uses Judge
Forrest’s decision in Hedges v. Obama as a vehicle for exploring the issues
with section 1021. Finally, Part IV recommends ways to define and clarify
key terms and provisions in section 1021. The goal of this part is to create a
more meaningful detention statute that provides clear congressional
guidance on the scope of detention authority to both the executive and the
courts.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXECUTIVE DETENTION
FROM 9/11 TO THE NDAA
Indefinite executive detention is not a new tactic created in response to
9/11. The executive and the military had previously detained individuals
without trial during both the Civil War8 and World War II.9 Although this
historical precedent continues to have an important impact, post-9/11
detention is different in many ways because of the unique and
unconventional nature of the current counterterrorism fight. This part traces
the development of post-9/11 executive detention. It begins with the
foundational statute that provides the legal authorization for the fight
against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and explains how the Supreme Court
interpreted this statute to include the power of indefinite detention. It then
examines how, after authorizing indefinite detention, the Supreme Court
struggled to develop procedural rights for detainees. Finally, this Section
analyzes section 1021 of the NDAA and establishes a framework for
evaluating presidential war powers using the famous Supreme Court
decision in Youngstown.
A. The AUMF Authorizes Force in the Wake of 9/11
Seven days after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress
passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force.10 The AUMF
“authorize[d] the use of United States Armed Forces against those

7. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
8. President Lincoln suspended the right of habeas corpus (thus preventing prisoners
from seeking judicial review). See Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md.
1861) (No. 9487).
9. Many Japanese Americans were detained at “Relocation Centers” without trial. See
Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 284–85 (1944).
10. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224.
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responsible for the recent attacks launched against the United States.”11 The
key language in the AUMF is: “the President is authorized to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons.”12
The Constitution grants the legislative branch the power to declare war,13
but in response to 9/11, Congress passed the AUMF (a force authorization)
instead of formally declaring war.14 Even though it is not a formal
declaration of war, the AUMF grants broad war powers to the executive.15
The language of the AUMF is deferential, allowing the President to use
force against those whom “he determines”16 were responsible.17 The
AUMF also adopts a war model (as opposed to a criminal model) for
combatting terrorism.18
Although the AUMF provides broad authority to the President, there are
limitations, and commentators have noted that these limits are more
difficult to determine in 2012 than they were immediately after 9/11.19 The
subsections below explore the limits of the AUMF. The major questions
are: (1) To whom does the AUMF apply?; (2) What does “all necessary
and appropriate force” include?; (3) Where does the AUMF apply and how
long does it last?

11. Id.
12. Id. § 2(a).
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
14. See Graham Cronogue, A New AUMF: Defining Combatants in the War on Terror,
22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 377, 390 (2012) (explaining that “the AUMF is not a formal
declaration of war”).
15. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2080 (2005) (“[T]he AUMF does not appear to
impose any limitation on either the resources or the methods that the President can employ.
Instead, the AUMF broadly authorizes the President to use ‘all necessary and appropriate
force’ to prosecute the war.”); Cronogue, supra note 14, at 388 (noting that “Congress
delegated the President extremely broad powers”).
16. AUMF § 2(a).
17. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2082 (“One could argue that the effect
of the ‘he determines’ provision is to give the President broad, and possibly unreviewable,
discretion . . . .”).
18. See Beau D. Barnes, Reauthorizing the “War on Terror”: The Legal and Policy
Implications of the AUMF’s Coming Obsolescence, 211 MIL. L. REV. 57, 66 (2012)
(explaining that a war paradigm allows the President to use his full Article II powers, while a
criminal model relies on criminal statutes and the courts). See generally Jonathan Hafetz,
Military Detention in the “War on Terrorism”: Normalizing the Exceptional After 9/11,
112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 31 (2012), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2012/03/31_Hafetz.pdf (highlighting concerns with the continued use of the war
paradigm).
19. See Barnes, supra note 18, at 67 (“Although the scope of the military force
authorized by the AUMF was sufficiently clear in October 2001, that is no longer the case
today.”).
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1. Who Does the AUMF Apply To?
The AUMF authorizes the President to use force against “nations,
organizations, or persons” that “planned, authorized, committed, or aided”
the attacks on 9/11 or those who “harbored” them.20 The AUMF does not
specifically name any “nations, organizations, or persons,” but rather
describes who it applies to.21 This lack of specificity was likely an
intentional decision by Congress due to the unconventional and changing
nature of the enemy.22 Additionally, the AUMF was passed so soon after
9/11 that the exact nature of the enemy was still unknown.23
The AUMF requires that a target have some connection to 9/11.24 The
AUMF is widely considered to apply, at a minimum, to Al Qaeda and the
Taliban.25 Courts and commentators have argued that the AUMF
authorizes force not only against these organizations themselves but against
all their individual members.26 Thus, a member of Al Qaeda who had no
connection to the 9/11 attacks or who joined after 9/11 might be targeted
under the AUMF based solely on his membership.27

20. AUMF § 2(a).
21. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2082 (“[The AUMF] describes rather
than names the enemies . . . .”); Cronogue, supra note 14, at 380 (“[I]t could be argued that
this authorization is unnecessarily unclear, as it does not explicitly name the nations against
whom force may be used.”).
22. Brief for Amici Curiae Senators John McCain, Lindsey Graham & Kelly Ayotte in
Support of Appellants at 1, Hedges v. Obama, Nos. 12-3176, 12-3644 (2d Cir. Nov. 13,
2012) [hereinafter Senators Amici Brief], available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/11/Hedges-Amicus-Brief-FINAL-2.pdf (“Because terrorists do not
wear uniforms and their alliances and affiliations are never static, [the AUMF] did not
declare any specific nation or organization our enemy . . . .”).
23. See 147 CONG. REC. 17,122 (2001) (statement of Rep. Spratt) (“We do not know for
sure who the enemy is, where he may be found, or who may be harboring him. Congress is
giving the President the authority to act before we have answers to these basic questions
because we cannot be paralyzed.”).
24. See David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and
Political Considerations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43
HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 73–74 (2002) (noting that Congress rejected an earlier version of the
AUMF that applied to all terrorist threats in general because Congress wanted the AUMF
tied to 9/11).
25. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“There can be no doubt that
individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an
organization known to have supported the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those
attacks, are individuals Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF.”); Cronogue, supra
note 14, at 381 (“Al-Qaeda, as an organized group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, clearly
fits this definition.”).
26. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d. 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2009) (“By authorizing the
use of force against the ‘organizations’ responsible for the September 11 attacks, Congress
also, necessarily, authorized the use of force (including detention) against their members.”);
see also Barnes, supra note 18, at 72 n.59 (“[B]ecause Al Qaeda has no headquarters or
major assets, targeting it amounts to targeting its members and structure.”).
27. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2109 (“This means that Congress has
authorized the President to use force against all members of al Qaeda, including members
who had nothing to do with the September 11 attacks and even new members who joined al
Qaeda after September 11.”).

2013]

A MORE MEANINGFUL DETENTION STATUTE

2859

Difficult questions arise when determining if the AUMF applies to any
organizations or individuals beyond Al Qaeda or the Taliban.28 Some
believe that in order to effectively fight terrorism, the AUMF must be
expanded beyond these two groups.29 This issue will be discussed more
thoroughly when evaluating the meaning of the term “associated forces” in
section 1021.30
2. All Necessary and Appropriate Force
Permitting the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force” is a
broad grant of power.31 For the purpose of this Note, the key question is
whether the AUMF includes the power to detain individuals indefinitely
without trial. As will be discussed further in the next part, the Supreme
Court decided that “all necessary and appropriate force” includes the power
of indefinite executive detention,32 and lower courts must follow this
precedent. The AUMF makes no specific mention of detention,33 and the
Supreme Court found that this power was implied in a broad grant of
congressional authority.
3. Where Does It Apply and How Long Does It Last?
Since Congress omitted explicit geographical limitations in the AUMF,
some argue that the President can use force anywhere, including within the
United States.34 The congressional record also contained many references
to the AUMF’s worldwide scope.35 Thus, the AUMF leaves open the
28. See Cronogue, supra note 14, at 381 (“[D]emarcating exactly where the al-Qaeda
organization ends and one of its ‘affiliates’ or ‘associated forces’ begins is extremely
difficult.”).
29. See Senators Amici Brief, supra note 22, at 20–21 (“Such a limitation—which
would exclude al-Qaeda terrorists recruited after 2001 and members of al-Qaeda ‘franchises’
in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere—would completely undermine the stated purpose of
the AUMF . . . .”). But see Robert Bejesky, Cognitive Foreign Policy: Linking Al-Qaeda
and Iraq, 56 HOW. L.J. 1, 8–11 (2012) (emphasizing the limited scope of permissible targets
under the AUMF).
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. See Cronogue, supra note 14, at 386 (“[T]he AUMF’s ‘all necessary and appropriate
force’ language[,] . . . far from imposing any constraints, bolsters the President’s powers
significantly.”).
32. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
33. See Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas
Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 789 (2011) (“The AUMF does not refer expressly to detention.”);
Diane Webber, Preventive Detention in the Law of Armed Conflict: Throwing Away the
Key?, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 167, 179 (2012) (“The AUMF does not mention
detention . . . .”).
34. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2117 (“The text of the AUMF imposes
no geographical limitation on the use of force. This distinguishes the AUMF from many
prior authorizations to use force that contained geographic restrictions.”). But see
Abramowitz, supra note 24, at 75 (arguing that based on the AUMF’s reference to the War
Powers Resolution and the statements of various congressmen, the AUMF was intended to
only authorize force abroad).
35. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. 17,125 (2001) (statement of Rep. Tanner) (“We are
declaring war against . . . terrorism wherever it exists on Earth.”).
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possibility of indefinitely detaining American citizens. Detention of
American citizens was expressly approved by the Supreme Court36 but
remains highly controversial and is disfavored by the Obama
Administration.37
In addition, it is unclear how long the AUMF lasts or if there is any event
that can trigger its termination other than congressional repeal.38 This is
particularly significant for indefinite detention, because it means that
individuals might “be detained for a long time” or even their entire lives
without ever being tried.39 The Supreme Court stated that the authority to
detain under the AUMF lasts “for the duration of the relevant conflict,” and
thus members of the Taliban can only be detained while “United States
troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan.”40 The conflict
with Al Qaeda, however, is not limited to Afghanistan and is not likely to
end soon,41 and thus it is possible that members of Al Qaeda and other
related terrorist organizations can be detained without trial under the
AUMF for decades to come.
B. The Supreme Court Finds Detention Authority in the AUMF
Given the broad and vague language of the AUMF, it was initially
unclear whether the AUMF included the power of indefinite detention. In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, however, the Supreme Court definitively resolved the
issue when it held that the AUMF is explicit congressional authorization for
detention.42 The case involved Yaser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen
born in Louisiana who was detained for fighting with the Taliban in
Afghanistan after 9/11.43 Hamdi was originally held at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, but he was transferred to a naval brig in South Carolina after

36. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own
citizens as an enemy combatant.”).
37. See Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 2 (Dec. 31, 2011) [hereinafter NDAA Presidential
Signing Statement] (“I want to clarify that my Administration will not authorize the
indefinite military detention without trial of American citizens.”).
38. See 147 CONG. REC. 17,047 (statement of Sen. Biden) (“[The AUMF] does not limit
the amount of time that the President may prosecute this action . . . .”). But see Barnes, supra
note 18, at 71 (arguing that, given the connection to 9/11, “it is nearly impossible for the
AUMF to last forever”).
39. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2124.
40. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
41. See Cheryl Pellerin, Panetta Details Steps Needed To End al-Qaida Threat, AM.
FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?
id=118606 (quoting Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta as stating about Al Qaeda that “the
cancer has also metastasized to other parts of the global body,” including Somalia and
Yemen); see also Greg Miller & Joby Warrick, Although Splintered, al-Qaeda Finds New
Life in Unstable Areas, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2013, at 1–2 (reporting that although Al Qaeda
has been weakened in its traditional strongholds, it has found new life in other unstable areas
of the world).
42. 542 U.S. at 517.
43. Id. at 510.
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authorities discovered he was an American citizen.44 The government
detained Hamdi as an “enemy combatant,”45 and Hamdi challenged his
detention in court.46
Justice O’Connor, writing for a four-Justice plurality,47 declared that
even though the AUMF does not mention detention, “[b]ecause detention to
prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of
waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force,’
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention.”48 In holding
that detention was fundamental to waging war, the Court evaluated a
domestic statute (the AUMF) in the context of international law principles
(the laws of war).49
Although the Court affirmed detention pursuant to the AUMF, it
recognized that the power to detain must be limited.50 First, the Court
stated that detention could only be used “to prevent a combatant’s return to
the battlefield” and not for other purposes like interrogation.51 Second, the
Court held that “due process demands that a citizen held in the United
States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest
the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”52 This
due process guarantee was problematic, however, because it could vary
according to the circumstances,53 and it was left for the lower courts to

44. Id.
45. For a thorough analysis of the concept of an “enemy combatant,” see Allison M.
Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1
(2007). The Obama Administration has since abandoned the term and now uses the phrase
“unprivileged enemy belligerents.” Webber, supra note 33, at 178.
46. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511.
47. Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote authorizing detention in a separate opinion in
which he stated that courts lack the institutional capacity to second-guess the President’s
exercise of war powers. See id. at 579; see also Chesney, supra note 33, at 807.
48. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519.
49. See Chesney, supra note 33, at 807 (“[T]he plurality framed the issue as turning on a
question of domestic law informed by reference to international law . . . .”). The inclusion of
international law is controversial and is discussed further in Part III.
50. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530 (“[A]n unchecked system of detention carries the
potential to become a means for oppression and abuse . . . .”); see also Dawn Johnsen, “The
Essence of a Free Society”: The Executive Powers Legacy of Justice Stevens and the Future
of Foreign Affairs Deference, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 467, 477 (2012) (noting that “five Justices
agreed that the AUMF conferred some military detention authority, but eight Justices [all but
Justice Clarence Thomas] found that the Bush Administration’s policy of unilateral,
unreviewable detention without counsel violated constitutional or statutory protections”).
51. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519, 521.
52. Id. at 509; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice
Jackson’s Wartime Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy Combatants,”
68 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2005) (stating that the Hamdi court reached the “ultimate
conclusion that executive detention of a citizen could not occur absent basic procedural
protections”).
53. See Sarah A. Whalin, National Security Versus Due Process: Korematsu Raises Its
Ugly Head Sixty Years Later in Hamdi and Padilla, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 711, 726 (2006)
(arguing that the Hamdi decision is not a victory for civil liberties because “one’s due
process right may vary depending on the weight of the government’s interests in denying
that right”).
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establish.54 Additionally, the Court seemed to limit these due process rights
to U.S. citizens,55 but the overwhelming majority of those detained were
foreign nationals.56
Thus, because these due process rights were vague and potentially
limited to American citizens, Hamdi set the stage for future congressional
legislation and legal challenges by foreign detainees. Although the
Supreme Court would issue three more decisions relating to the procedural
rights of detainees,57 Hamdi was the last and only time since 9/11 that the
Court has addressed the substantive scope of executive detention.58
While the Hamdi decision evaluated the rights of an American citizen
challenging his detention, the decision in Rasul v. Bush (released on the
same day as Hamdi) evaluated the rights of noncitizens detained at
Guantanamo Bay.59 The Supreme Court held that “the United States
exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over [Guantanamo],” and thus
federal district courts had “jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus
challenges to the legality of their detention.”60 Justice Stevens’s majority
opinion affirmed the right of detainees held at Guantanamo Bay to
challenge their detention in federal court (by filing a writ of habeas corpus),
regardless of their citizenship status or national origin.61

54. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538–39 (“We anticipate that a District Court would proceed with
the caution that we have indicated is necessary . . . . We have no reason to doubt that courts
faced with these sensitive matters will pay proper heed . . . .”).
55. See Thomas L. Hemingway, Wartime Detention of Enemy Combatants: What If
There Were a War and No One Could Be Detained Without an Attorney?, 34 DENV. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 63, 78 (2006) (stating that the due process rights recognized in Hamdi are
“arguably limited to citizens or those with significant U.S. contacts.”).
56. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 577 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that, at the time, there
were only two known American citizens who were detained as enemy combatants, Hamdi
and Jose Padilla); see also Benjamin Wittes & Robert Chesney, NDAA FAQ: A Guide for
the Perplexed, LAWFARE (Dec. 19, 2011, 3:31 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/12/
ndaa-faq-a-guide-for-the-perplexed/ (stating that “[t]he government has not asserted
authority to detain a citizen under the AUMF” since Jose Padilla).
57. There are two additional Supreme Court decisions affecting detainees that are not
discussed in this Note. See Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (holding that the
government had mooted the case by transferring the detainee to the civilian court system);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (holding that the detainee had chosen the wrong
venue to file his habeas petition).
58. See Chesney, supra note 33, at 806 (“The sole post-9/11 instance in which the
Supreme Court has addressed the substantive-scope issue to any serious extent is its 2004
decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.”). Compare Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure:
Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 664 (2009)
(arguing that by enforcing procedural requirements in executive detention cases, “courts
have affected the law of national security in profound ways by explicitly requiring the
political branches to adhere to a judicially imposed standard of transparency and
deliberation”), with Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,”
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1092 (2008) (arguing that “the ‘war on terror’ litigation thus far
seems to have resulted in a great deal of process, and not much justice”).
59. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
60. Id. at 480, 484.
61. Id. at 485; see also Johnsen, supra note 50, at 469–70, 481.
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C. Congress and the Supreme Court Battle over Procedural Rights
In response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hamdi and Rasul,
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA).62 In addition
to declaring standards of treatment for detainees,63 the DTA modified the
detention review process. The DTA permitted limited oversight of the
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) that operated at Guantanamo
Bay64 and provided an “annual review to determine the need to continue to
detain an alien who is a detainee.”65 The DTA stripped federal courts of the
ability to consider habeas corpus petitions or other actions by detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, and it limited review of CSRT determinations to the D.C.
Circuit.66 The DTA did not create a substantive detention standard, but it
significantly limited the procedural rights available to detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay.67
Despite Congress’s attempt to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court issued a decision affecting detainee rights less than a year
later. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court bypassed the jurisdiction-stripping
provisions of the DTA by determining that the DTA only applied to new
cases, and not cases that were pending at the time that the DTA was
passed.68 After addressing this threshold jurisdictional question, the Court
went on to invalidate the military commission convened to try a Yemeni
detainee69 held at Guantanamo Bay because the commission violated both
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva
Conventions.70 The Court held that the commission was invalid because it
allowed for closed proceedings where “[t]he accused and his civilian
counsel may be excluded from, and precluded from ever learning what
evidence was presented.”71 The commission also had lenient evidentiary
standards and denied the detainee a right to appeal his conviction to civilian
judges.72 The Court held that, in order to be valid, “the rules applied to
62. Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–1006, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–44 (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 801 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)).
63. The DTA banned “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” of any
detainee “under the physical control of the United States Government,” and it limited
interrogation techniques to those listed in the Army Field Manual. Id. § 1003(a); see also id.
§ 1002(a).
64. The CSRTs, created by the Department of Defense, were hearings presided over by
three members of the military who determined if a detainee had been properly classified as
an enemy combatant. See Mark Denbeaux et al., No-Hearing Hearings: An Analysis of the
Proceedings of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals at Guantanamo, 41 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1231, 1232–33 (2011) (taking a critical view of the process afforded by CSRTs).
65. DTA § 1005(a)(1)(A).
66. Id. § 1005(e).
67. See Chesney, supra note 33, at 791.
68. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576 (2006).
69. The petitioner was Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni national captured by the U.S.
military in Afghanistan. The government accused him of being a bodyguard and driver for
Osama bin Laden. Id. at 566, 570.
70. Id. at 567.
71. Id. at 614.
72. See id. at 587, 614.
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military commissions must be the same as those applied to courts-martial”
under the UCMJ,73 and that, despite the contrary view of the Bush
Administration, detainees were additionally protected by Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions.74
The Hamdan decision forced the Bush Administration to seek
congressional approval for military commissions,75 and Congress obliged
by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (2006 MCA).76 As its
name suggests, the MCA established the jurisdiction and procedures (in
light of the Court’s guidance in Hamdan) for a system of military
commissions to try those who committed “violations of the law of war and
other offenses.”77 This Note does not address the specific procedures used
in the military commissions system.78
In section 7 of the MCA, Congress repeated the provisions of the DTA
that denied federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions
brought by detainees.79 Congress also declared that this applied to “all
cases, without exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment,”80
and thus closed the loophole used by the Court in Hamdan to retain
jurisdiction.
In its most recent expansion of detainee rights, Boumediene v. Bush, the
Supreme Court held that detainees at Guantanamo Bay “do have the habeas
corpus privilege,” and that section 7 of the MCA impermissibly interfered
with this privilege.81 The Court held that section 7 violated the Suspension
Clause of the Constitution, which allows habeas corpus to be suspended
only “when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require

73. Id. at 620.
74. Johnsen, supra note 50, at 487 (“The Court instead found to the contrary that
Common Article 3 applied to the conflict with al Qaeda . . . .”).
75. See id. at 493; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal
Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 70 (2006) (“The most important doctrinal
lesson of Hamdan is its repudiation of the claim that the President is entitled to act alone.”).
76. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and
42 U.S.C.).
77. Id. § 948b(a), 120 Stat. at 2602.
78. This Note focuses on indefinite detention and does not cover military commissions
in detail. It is important to understand, however, that a military commission is a type of trial
that requires formal charges and an adjudication of guilt or innocence. See generally Victor
M. Hansen & Lawrence Friedman, The Value of the Military Commissions Act As
Nonjudicial Precedent in the Context of Litigation over National Security Policymaking, 53
S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–16 (2011). In contrast, a person who is held indefinitely might never
receive notice of why he is being detained, let alone be brought to trial. In 2009, Congress
passed a new Military Commissions Act (2009 MCA) that changed some of the procedures.
See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. 18, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–
2614 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a (Supp. V 2011).
79. 2006 MCA § 7(a). (“No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained
by the United States . . . . [or] any other action against the United States or its agents relating
to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement.”).
80. Id. § 7(b).
81. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240–43 (2008).
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it.”82 However, the Court in Boumediene did not definitively decide
whether the right of habeas corpus applies to detainees held outside of the
United States or Guantanamo Bay.83
The Boumediene decision had “an enormous practical impact”84 and
created a “flood of habeas corpus litigation arising out of Guantanamo” in
the lower federal courts.85 Although the Boumediene decision solidified the
right of habeas corpus for detainees at Guantanamo, it provided little
guidance on how these habeas petitions should be evaluated.86 The
Supreme Court instead delegated these substantive issues to the lower
federal courts, specifically the District Court for the District of Columbia.87
Boumediene was a purely procedural decision88 that effectively delegated to
the D.C. District Court (and the D.C. Circuit on appeal) the power to define
the limits of lawful executive detention.89 Part II of this Note examines
how the D.C. courts struggled to develop the substantive scope and limits of
executive detention.
D. The NDAA Codifies Detention Authority
On December 31, 2011, President Obama signed into law the National
Defense Authorization Act,90 an extensive act containing five divisions and
spanning over 550 pages.91 President Obama “signed this bill despite
having serious reservations with certain provisions that regulate the

82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl 2.
83. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that detainees held
at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan were not protected by the Suspension Clause and thus
could not file habeas corpus petitions).
84. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Unreviewable Executive: Kiyemba, Maqaleh, and the
Obama Administration, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 603, 613 (2010) (noting that many cases were
now allowed to proceed).
85. Chesney, supra note 33, at 769.
86. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240 (“We do not address whether the President has
authority to detain these petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue. These and other
questions regarding the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the
District Court.”).
87. See id. at 2276 (“[T]he Government can move for change of venue to . . . the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia . . . . These and the other remaining
questions are within the expertise and competence of the District Court to address in the first
instance.”).
88. See id. at 2277 (“It bears repeating that our opinion does not address the content of
the law that governs petitioners’ detention. That is a matter yet to be determined.”).
89. See Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Meeting Boumediene’s Challenge: The Emergence of an
Effective Habeas Jurisprudence and Obsolescence of New Detention Legislation, 95 MINN.
L. REV. 244, 245 (2010) (“With minimal guidance from the Supreme Court and Congress,
the federal courts in the District of Columbia have functioned, in effect, as a national
security court, evaluating sensitive evidence and developing their own guidelines as to what
constitutes lawful detention.”).
90. Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
91. Id.; see also NDAA Presidential Signing Statement, supra note 37, at 1 (“Today I
have signed into law H.R. 1540, the ‘National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012.’”).
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detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected terrorists.”92 One of
the provisions that caused the President to have “serious reservations” about
the NDAA was section 1021.93
Section 1021 is titled “Affirmation of Authority of the Armed Forces of
the United States to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant to the Authorization
for Use of Military Force.”94 This section “affirms that the authority of the
President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the [AUMF]
includes the authority for the Armed Forces of the United States to detain
covered persons . . . pending disposition under the law of war.”95 Section
1021 specifies two categories of “covered persons” that can be detained:
section 1021(b)(1) applies to those who “planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored those responsible,” and section 1021(b)(2) applies to those who
were “a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or
its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent
act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.”96
President Obama commented that, despite new language in the NDAA
that is not included in the AUMF, section 1021 “breaks no new ground and
is unnecessary.”97 The President’s interpretation is supported by a
subsection of section 1021 titled “Construction,” which states that
“[n]othing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of the
President or the scope of the [AUMF].”98 Another subsection, titled
“Authorities,” further limits section 1021 by declaring that “[n]othing in
this section shall be construed to affect existing law or authorities relating
to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the
United States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in the
United States.”99
Although other statutes (like the DTA and MCA) have dealt with
executive detention, section 1021 of the NDAA is the first statute to
explicitly codify the President’s substantive authority to detain terrorist
suspects pursuant to the AUMF.100 As commentators have recognized, the

92. NDAA Presidential Signing Statement, supra note 37, at 1.
93. Id.
94. NDAA § 1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
95. Id. § 1021(a), 125 Stat. at 1562.
96. Id. § 1021(b)(1)–(2), 125 Stat. at 1562.
97. NDAA Presidential Signing Statement, supra note 37, at 1 (“The authority it
describes was included in the 2001 AUMF, as recognized by the Supreme Court and
confirmed through lower court decisions since then.”).
98. NDAA § 1021(d), 125 Stat. at 1562.
99. Id. § 1021(e), 125 Stat. at 1562. This subsection of section 1021 is also referred to
as Feinstein Amendment I in this Note.
100. See Glenn Greenwald, Three Myths About the Detention Bill, SALON (Dec. 16,
2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/12/16/three_myths_about_the_detention_bill/ (stating
that “this is the first time this power of indefinite detention is being expressly codified by
statute”).
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problem is that the meaning of section 1021 is far from clear.101 There are
two general views about the scope of section 1021. Some, including the
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, believe that it does
nothing new.102 Others view section 1021 as a dangerous expansion of the
power of executive detention beyond the scope of the AUMF.103
Regardless of whether section 1021 actually expands the President’s
substantive detention authority, both sides seem to agree on two things.
First, section 1021 is significant because irrespective of its precise meaning,
it is an explicit congressional affirmation of executive detention
practices.104 As will be discussed in the next section, congressional
approval can significantly expand the President’s war powers. Second,
section 1021 leaves open the possibility of indefinite detention of American
citizens.105 As mentioned above, section 1021(e) merely states that the law
remains unchanged regarding citizens, lawful resident aliens, or persons
captured in the United States. It does not affirmatively state that individuals
in these categories cannot be detained. The language of section 1021(e)
(also known as the Feinstein Amendment I) leaves the question of whether
American citizens can be indefinitely detained to the other branches.106
The Supreme Court recognized the right to detain an American citizen in
Hamdi107—a right, however, that appears to be against the policy of the
Obama Administration.108 As one Senator predicted, “[t]hese detention
101. See Conference, War, Terror, and the Federal Courts, Ten Years After 9/11, 61 AM.
U. L. REV. 1253, 1262 (2012) (“What has Congress done or not done?”); Webber, supra note
33, at 198 (“It is, however, unclear what all of these qualifying words actually mean.”).
102. See 157 CONG. REC. S8633 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin)
(“Neither the Senate bill nor the conference report establishes new authority to detain
American citizens—or anybody else.”); see also Wittes & Chesney, supra note 56, at 2
(“Nobody who is not subject to detention today will become so when the NDAA goes into
effect.”); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Detention Debates, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1052 (2012)
(book review).
103. See generally David Cole, Gitmo Forever? Congress’s Dangerous New Bill, NYR
BLOG (Dec. 8, 2011, 5:25 PM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/dec/08/gitmoforever-dangerous-new-bill/; Amanda Simon, President Obama Signs Indefinite Detention
into Law, ACLU (Dec. 31, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/
president-obama-signs-indefinite-detention-law.
104. See Greenwald, supra note 100, at 5 (“[T]here are serious dangers and harms from
having Congress . . . put its institutional, statutory weight behind powers previously claimed
and seized by the President alone.”); Wittes & Chesney, supra note 56, at 2 (“It puts
Congress’s stamp of approval behind [the authority the Administration claims] for the first
time, and that’s no small thing.”).
105. See Wittes & Chesney, supra note 56, at 2–3 (explaining that an amendment to
prevent the detention of U.S. citizens was rejected and that the NDAA leaves the possibility
open).
106. See 157 CONG. REC. S8634 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin)
(“[T]he language of the Feinstein amendment . . . leaves this issue to the executive branch
and the courts”).
107. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
108. See Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-14: Directive on Procedures Implementing
Section 1022 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 2012 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Feb. 28, 2012) (“the phrase ‘Covered Person’ applies only to a person
who is not a citizen of the United States”); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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provisions, even as they are amended, will present numerous constitutional
questions that the courts will inevitably have to resolve.”109
E. Separation of Powers Concerns During War
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is generally considered the
“seminal case on separation of powers during wartime.”110 The Court had
to decide in Youngstown “whether the President was acting within his
constitutional power when he issued an order directing the Secretary of
Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation’s steel
mills.”111 President Truman issued this order at “the peak of the Korean
War . . . in order to prevent a threatened strike by the United Steelworkers
of America.”112 President Truman feared that a “strike would cripple the
war effort in Korea.”113
In the Youngstown decision, the majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions lay out three different theories of presidential war powers. In this
Note, these three theories are called (1) the limited theory, (2) the relational
theory, and (3) the expansive theory. Each of these theories will be
discussed briefly below. This Note uses the relational theory, as explained
by Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, as a framework for
evaluating executive detention and section 1021 of the NDAA. The
Supreme Court recently recognized that “Justice Jackson’s familiar
tripartite scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive
action” in foreign affairs.114
1. The Limited Theory of Presidential War Powers
Justice Black’s majority opinion in Youngstown expressed a limited view
of presidential war powers. This view has also been called a “formalist
approach.”115 Justice Black stated that “[t]he President’s power, if any, to
issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the

109. 157 CONG. REC. S8646 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mark Udall).
110. Avidan Y. Cover, Supervisory Responsibility for the Office of Legal Counsel, 25
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 269, 280 (2012); see also Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy
of Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (2010) (“Youngstown is one of the most
celebrated cases dealing with the separation of powers, and even contends for best in
show.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1206, 1217 (2006)
(stating that Youngstown is a “super precedent,” which refers to decisions that “take on a
special status in constitutional law as landmark opinions, so encrusted and deeply embedded
in constitutional law that they have become practically immune to reconsideration and
reversal.”).
111. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
112. Elizabeth Bahr & Josh Blackman, Youngstown’s Fourth Tier: Is There a Zone of
Insight Beyond the Zone of Twilight?, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 541, 551 (2010).
113. Id.
114. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 494 (2008).
115. See Bahr & Blackman, supra note 112, at 551, 559; William N. Eskridge,
Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 23–24 (1998).
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Constitution itself.”116 Justice Black held that the seizure of the steel mills
lacked express statutory authority, and there was no “act of Congress . . .
from which such a power [could] fairly be implied.”117
Justice Black also determined that the President had exceeded his
constitutional powers. He explained that the President’s Commander-inChief power was limited to the “theater of war,” which did not include
domestic production facilities.118 Additionally, the seizure did not fall
under the President’s power to execute the laws, because Justice Black saw
it as lawmaking and not execution.119
2. The Relational Theory of Presidential War Powers
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter both wrote concurring opinions in
Youngstown expressing the idea that presidential powers can change over
time based on action or inaction by Congress. Justice Jackson stated, in his
famous concurrence, that “[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate,
depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”120
Justice Jackson established a three-category framework for evaluating
presidential power in relation to Congress. In the first category, or Zone 1,
the President’s authority is the greatest because he is acting “pursuant to an
express or implied authorization of Congress . . . .”121 If the President’s
action falls within Zone 1, he “personif[ies] the federal sovereignty” and
has the full power of the federal government.122 In the second category,
called Zone 2 or the “zone of twilight,” the President “acts in absence of
either a congressional grant or denial of authority . . . .”123 Here, the
President’s power is less, but “congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not
invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”124 In the third
category, the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb” because he is pursuing
“measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress
. . . .”125 In Zone 3, the President “can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter.”126
116. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585.
117. Id. Like Justices Jackson and Frankfurter’s concurrences, Justice Black’s view of
presidential war powers is also relational to Congress because Congress can expand the
President’s powers, but only by expressly enacting a statute.
118. Id. at 587.
119. Id. at 588.
120. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 635.
122. Id. at 636; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1981) (noting that
when the President acts in accordance with congressional authorization, the Presidential
action can only be invalid if “the Federal Government as a whole lacked the power exercised
by the President”).
123. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence also declared that presidential powers
were relational to Congress and could change over time.127 “Deeply
embedded traditional ways of conducting government,” according to Justice
Frankfurter, could provide a “gloss” on the words of the Constitution and
affect their interpretation.128 Thus, if Congress has not objected or
interfered with a longstanding presidential exercise of power, that inaction
could be seen as a “gloss” that expands the power of the President.129
Almost thirty years later in Dames & Moore v. Regan,130 Justice
Rehnquist referenced both the Jackson and Frankfurter concurrences in
Youngstown in an opinion concerning whether the President could nullify
“attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, direct[] that
these assets be transferred to Iran, and suspend[] claims against Iran that
may be presented to an International Claims Tribunal.”131 While
embracing the general concept of Justice Jackson’s three-category
framework, Justice Rehnquist noted that “executive action in any particular
instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some
point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to
explicit congressional prohibition.”132 With respect to the President
suspending claims in U.S. courts, Justice Rehnquist held that, even though
there was not explicit congressional authorization, the “general tenor of
Congress’ legislation in this area” and “a history of congressional
acquiescence” supported this exercise of presidential power.133
3. The Expansive Theory of Presidential War Powers
In his Youngstown dissent, Chief Justice Vinson, joined by two other
Justices, articulated a more expansive view of presidential powers,
especially during times of war and national emergency.134 He rejected the
majority’s opinion because it left the President “powerless at the very
moment when the need for action may be most pressing and when no one,
other than he, is immediately capable of action.”135 Although the Framers
of the Constitution did not want an “autocrat,” they also did not want “an
127. Id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To be sure, the content of the three
authorities of government is not to be derived from an abstract analysis. The areas are partly
interacting, not wholly disjointed.”).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 610–11. (“In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who
have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the
President by § 1 of Art. II.”).
130. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
131. Id. at 660.
132. Id. at 669.
133. Id. at 678.
134. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (“A world not yet recovered
from the devastation of World War II has been forced to face the threat of another and more
terrifying global conflict.”).
135. Id. at 680–81.
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automaton impotent to exercise the powers of Government” during a
national emergency.136 In addition to providing an extensive list of past
examples where the President had acted during times of emergency, the
Chief Justice also stated that, “[w]ith or without explicit statutory
authorization, Presidents have at such times dealt with national emergencies
by acting promptly and resolutely to enforce legislative programs, at least to
save those programs until Congress could act.”137 The Chief Justice
pointed out that President Truman had invited Congress to act, and that
twelve days had passed without any congressional action.138
Justice Sutherland advocated for the expansive view of presidential
power almost twenty years earlier in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.139 Justice Sutherland stated that only in the realm of domestic affairs
was presidential power limited to powers enumerated in the Constitution.140
In foreign affairs, the President had “plenary and exclusive power . . . as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”
and was best equipped to deal with foreign nations.141
Although the expansive view of presidential war powers (sometimes
called the unitary executive theory) has mostly fallen out of favor, it still
has some proponents. Justice Thomas’s dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
advocates a broad view of presidential war powers and a very limited role
for the courts.142
II. THE D.C. COURTS STRUGGLE TO DEFINE THE LIMITS OF DETENTION
This part examines how the D.C. District and Circuit courts struggled
with the legal boundaries of detention while evaluating the habeas corpus
petitions of detainees from 2008 to 2012. It focuses on how the D.C. courts
analyzed what would become the three criteria for detention in section
1021(b)(2) of the NDAA: (1) being “part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban;
(2) “substantially support[ing]” Al Qaeda or the Taliban; and (3) being part
of “associated forces” of Al Qaeda or the Taliban.143
The Supreme Court has not decided the merits of a detention case since
Boumediene in 2008.144 Additionally, in 2011 the Supreme Court denied
certiorari to six different Guantanamo detainee cases appealed from the
136. Id. at 682.
137. Id. at 683.
138. Id. at 677.
139. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
140. Id. at 315–16 (“The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution . . . is categorically true only
in respect of our internal affairs.”).
141. Id. at 320.
142. 542 U.S. 507, 582 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143. See NDAA § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
144. See Johnsen, supra note 50, at 470 (“After deciding five military detention cases in
five years, the Supreme Court has not since 2008 decided the merits of another case that
involves the rights of Guantánamo detainees or otherwise defines the scope of the
President’s military detention authority.”).
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D.C. Circuit.145 As a result of its continued abstention, the Supreme Court
has had little impact in shaping the substantive parameters of executive
detention.146
The substantive law of executive detention has been primarily created by
the D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit as they evaluate habeas corpus
petitions from detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.147 As the law has
evolved since 2008, the D.C. courts have often applied different or
changing standards, and some believe that “the D.C. Circuit’s opinions
Additionally, some
almost uniformly favor the government.”148
commentators have expressed concerns about “the habeas process as a
lawmaking device” and fear that the standards established by the D.C.
Courts are “interim steps” or “a kind of draft” until the Supreme Court
eventually steps in to resolve the issues.149
The judges of the D.C. courts recognize that they are creating law. In
their opinions, they have often commented on the lack of guidance from the
Supreme Court150 and their significant role in shaping substantive detention
law with each decision.151
The subsections below focus on the three detention criteria listed in
section 1021(b)(2) of the NDAA. Although these criteria were codified in
the NDAA in late 2011, the D.C. courts struggled with their meaning in the
years after the Boumediene decision in 2008. As one court admitted in
145. Id. at 471.
146. See Linda Greenhouse, A Supreme Court Scorecard, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July
13, 2011, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/a-supreme-courtscorecard (“Missing in Action: The court’s voice on Guantanamo. The justices turned down
half a dozen opportunities to review how the lower federal courts in the District of Columbia
are handling the habeas corpus petitions . . . .”); see also Benjamin Wittes, David Remes on
Al Adahi Cert Denial, LAWFARE (Jan. 18, 2011, 8:22 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2011/01/david-remes-on-al-adahi-cert-denial (“The Supreme Court . . . has shown no
appetite for getting involved in the nitty gritty of the writing of the rules that will govern
detention.”).
147. See Benjamin Wittes, Robert M. Chesney & Larkin Reynolds, The Emerging Law of
Detention 2.0: The Guantanamo Habeas Cases As Lawmking, BROOKINGS INST. (May 12,
2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2011/05/guantanamo-wittes (“[T]hese
rules will be written by judges through the common-law process of litigating the habeas
corpus cases of the roughly 170 detainees still held at Guantanamo”).
148. Nesbitt, supra note 89, at 246–47.
149. Wittes et al., supra note 147, at 3; see also Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 52,
Hedges v. Obama, Nos. 12-3176, 12-3644 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 2012) [hereinafter PlaintiffsAppellees Brief], available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/
Hedges-Appellees-Brief.pdf (noting that habeas review is limited and requires years of
detention before a detainee gets a judicial hearing).
150. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court
has provided scant guidance on these questions, consciously leaving the contours of the
substantive and procedural law of detention open for lower courts to shape in a common law
fashion.”); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Bereft of any
definitive guidance from the Supreme Court.”).
151. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he Supreme
Court acknowledged that the district courts would have to address this issue in a piecemeal
fashion by delimiting ‘[t]he permissible bounds’ of the government’s detention authority ‘as
subsequent cases are presented to them.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
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2010, “much of what our Constitution requires for this context remains
unsettled.”152
A. What It Means To Be “Part Of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban
There is general agreement among the courts that a person who is “part
of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban can be lawfully detained without trial.153 The
more difficult question is what criteria should be used to determine who is
actually a “part of” these organizations. Even as late as June of 2010 (six
years after the Supreme Court authorized detention in Hamdi), the D.C.
Circuit admitted that this was still an unresolved issue.154
One issue that is relatively settled is the evidentiary standard. The courts
generally agree that a preponderance of the evidence standard should be
used when evaluating habeas corpus petitions.155 Courts also emphasize
that circumstantial evidence should be viewed holistically and it is legal
error to take an “unduly atomized approach” that looks only at individual
pieces of evidence in isolation.156
1. The Command-Structure Test vs. the Functional Approach
The two major tests used by the D.C. courts to determine membership in
Al Qaeda or the Taliban are the command-structure test and the functional
approach. The command-structure test was the initial way to determine
membership, but courts eventually moved to the functional approach
because it was less rigid and more holistic.
a. The Emergence of the Command Structure Test
The early test used by the D.C. District Court to determine if an
individual was “part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban was the commandstructure test. The court explained that, under this test, “[t]he key inquiry,
then, is . . . whether the individual functions or participates within or under
the command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he receives and

152. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 882.
153. See Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 724–25 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he AUMF
authorizes the Executive to detain, at the least, any individual who is functionally part of al
Qaeda.”); Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 73 (“Moreover, the government’s claimed authority to
detain those who were ‘part of’ those organizations is entirely consistent with the law of war
principles that govern non-international armed conflicts.”).
154. See Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]his court has yet
to delineate the precise contours of the ‘part of’ inquiry.”).
155. See Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Lest there be any further
misunderstandings, let us be absolutely clear. A preponderance of the evidence standard
satisfies constitutional requirements in considering a habeas petition from a detainee held
pursuant to the AUMF.”).
156. Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1193–94 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he district court’s
[unduly atomized] treatment of the evidence in this case provides an alternative basis for
remand.”).
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executes orders or directions.”157 The command-structure test was also
used by one panel of the D.C. Circuit, although the court noted that this test
was not the exclusive way to prove that an individual was “part of” Al
Qaeda or the Taliban.158
In Abdah v. Obama,159 the district court granted the habeas corpus
petition of a detainee at Guantanamo Bay because the government failed to
prove that he was a member of Al Qaeda under the command-structure
test.160 The court determined that the detainee was not “part of” Al Qaeda
even though the court acknowledged that, among other things, the detainee
had “received money for his trip to Afghanistan from an individual who
supported jihad” and “was with Al Qaeda members in the vicinity of Tora
Bora after the battle that occurred there.”161 Similarly, in Mohammed v.
Obama,162 the district court granted the detainee’s habeas corpus petition
because he “had not yet acquired a role within the ‘military command
structure’ of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban . . . .”163 Even though the detainee
had been recruited at a radical mosque and had traveled to Afghanistan for
the purpose of fighting against U.S. forces, the court ruled that, at the time
of capture, he had not yet fully become “part of” Al Qaeda or the
Taliban.164
b. The Transition to a Functional, Case-by-Case Approach
The D.C. courts eventually moved away from the command-structure test
to a more flexible approach. In Awad v. Obama,165 the D.C. Circuit
rejected the command-structure test as the sole method of proving that an
individual is “part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban.166 Because the commandstructure test was created by the district courts and was not derived from the
AUMF or any other authority, the courts were comfortable departing from

157. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 75; see also Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1,
31 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting the command-structure test from Hamlily).
158. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“When the
government shows that an individual received and executed orders from al-Qaida members
. . . that evidence is sufficient (but not necessary) to prove that the individual has affiliated
himself with al-Qaida.”).
159. 708 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2010).
160. Id. at 22 (“Even taken together, these facts do not convince the Court by a
preponderance of the evidence that Uthman received and executed orders from Al Qaeda.”).
161. Id.
162. 704 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).
163. Id. at 31.
164. See id. at 32 (“In short, Petitioner may well have started down the path toward
becoming a member or substantial supporter of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban, but on this
record he had not yet achieved that status.”).
165. 608 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
166. Id. (“But there are ways other than making a ‘command structure’ showing to prove
that a detainee is ‘part of’ al Qaeda.”).
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precedent.167 The command-structure test was created by the D.C. District
Court without “any meaningful guidance from Congress.”168
In the decisions that followed Awad, the D.C. Circuit continued to reject
the command-structure test as the exclusive test for membership
determinations.169 The D.C. Circuit viewed the command-structure test as
overly formalistic, and it transitioned to a case-by-case, functional
evaluation of whether an individual is “part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban.170
The command-structure test was rejected (at least in part) because the
courts realized that they had little understanding about how groups like Al
Qaeda were organized.171 The transition to a functional, case-by-case
analysis has generally expanded the government’s detention authority.
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged that, under the functional approach, “it is
impossible to provide an exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether
an individual is ‘part of’ al Qaeda.”172 Rather than looking at one factor in
isolation, courts must consider the evidence in its totality to see if it
establishes a coherent “mosaic”173 or likely probability that an individual is
“part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban.174 Thus, the best way to analyze the
functional approach is to examine some of the factors that appear in
multiple cases.
Evidence proving that a detainee fought alongside Al Qaeda or the
Taliban is widely considered sufficient to show that the detainee was “part
of” these organizations.175 Additionally, evidence showing that a detainee
received weapons or tactics training at a training camp is usually sufficient

167. Id. at 11–12 (“Nowhere in the AUMF is there a mention of command structure . . . .
Awad points us to no legal authority for the proposition that he must be a part of al Qaeda’s
‘command structure’ to be detained.”).
168. Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 751 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
169. See Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]his Court has
rejected ‘command structure’ as the test for determining whether someone is part of al
Qaeda.”).
170. See Salahi, 625 F.3d at 751–52 (“These decisions make clear that the determination
of whether an individual is ‘part of’ al-Qaida ‘must be made on a case-by-case basis by using
a functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the actions of the individual
in relation to the organization.’” (quoting Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir.
2010))).
171. See Bensayah, 610 F.3d at 725 (“Although it is clear al Qaeda has, or at least at one
time had, a particular organizational structure . . . the details of its structure are generally
unknown . . . .”).
172. Id.
173. For a skeptical view of the “mosaic theory,” see Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp.
2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he mosaic theory is only as persuasive as the tiles which
compose it and the glue which binds them together . . . . [I]f the individual pieces of a
mosaic are inherently flawed or do not fit together, then the mosaic will split apart.”).
174. The court in Al-Adahi v. Obama referred to the idea of conditional probability,
where each additional piece of evidence makes it more likely that an individual is “part of”
Al Qaeda or the Taliban. 613 F.3d 1102, 1105–06 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
175. See generally Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Al Alwi fought
under the leadership of . . . a high-level al Qaeda member responsible for commanding Arab
and Taliban troops in Kabul.”).
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to prove membership.176 Even evidence of informal training conducted
outside of a training camp may be sufficient to show that an individual was
“part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban.177
Given that fighting alongside or training with Al Qaeda or the Taliban
generally supports membership, what if an individual is detained before he
reaches this stage? The paragraphs below examine factors that are less
conclusive than fighting or training, but may nonetheless still persuade the
courts that the detainee is “part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
Evidence that a detainee stayed at an Al Qaeda or Taliban guesthouse is
often used by the government to show that the detainee was en route to a
training camp or the battlefield.178 In Sulayman v. Obama,179 the detainee
submitted a declaration from a political science professor (who was an
expert in Yemeni history) that stated that “there is nothing inherently
suspicious or sinister about . . . stay[ing] in guesthouses” in Pakistan or
Afghanistan.180 While acknowledging that some innocent guesthouses
might exist, the court found it “implausible that guesthouses being operated
for the benefit of Taliban fighters engaged in warfare are simultaneously
providing charitable lodging to strangers in need, as the petitioner
suggests.”181 Thus, staying at an Al Qaeda or Taliban affiliated guesthouse
is strong evidence that an individual was “part of” these groups and was
preparing to either train or fight.182
Courts have held that traveling on a route frequently used by other Al
Qaeda or Taliban members is “probative evidence” that an individual is a
part of one of these organizations.183 Additionally, courts have determined
that individuals who interact or associate with members of Al Qaeda or the
176. See Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1, 6 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]hat a petitioner
trained at an al Qaeda camp . . . ‘overwhelmingly’ would carry the government’s burden.”
(citation omitted)); Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]raining at
. . . al Qaeda training camps is compelling evidence that the trainee was part of al Qaeda.”).
177. See Hussein v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 67, 78 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he petitioner’s
receipt of a Kalashnikov rifle from three Taliban guards . . . as well as the training he
received from one of the Taliban guards regarding how to use the weapon, constitutes
probative, if not conclusive, evidence supporting the petitioner’s detention.”).
178. See Sulayman v. Obama, 729 F. Supp. 2d 26, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2010) (“In support of
its case for detention, the government . . . asserts that [redacted] served as training camp
facilitation hubs [redacted][and] stations for frontline fighters . . . and that the guesthouse
‘was used as a transition point [redacted] for individuals going to train at various training
camps.’” (redactions in original)).
179. 729 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C 2010).
180. Id. at 47.
181. Id. at 48.
182. For cases where the guesthouse factor was considered, see Almerfedi v. Obama, 654
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Adahi v.
Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir.
2010); Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).
183. Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]raveling to Afghanistan
along a distinctive path used by al Qaeda members can be probative evidence that the
traveler was part of al Qaeda.”); see also Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175, 1194 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (“Nor did the district court consider that Latif’s admitted route to Afghanistan from
his home in Yemen corroborates the evidence that Latif trained with the Taliban.”).
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Taliban are likely to be members themselves.184 In one example of
membership by association, the court emphasized the petitioner’s close
familial ties to Osama bin Laden (including “two personal meetings” with
bin Laden)185 and, in another, the court focused on the fact that Al Qaeda
had treated the petitioner “as one of their own.”186
Courts disagree about whether suspicious travel circumstances are
enough to prove membership. In Al-Adahi v. Obama,187 the court
determined that it was strong corroborative evidence that the petitioner’s
travel to Afghanistan had been organized and paid for by an Al Qaeda
affiliate.188 In Mohammed, however, the court found that even though a
jihadi recruiter had “paid for and arranged [the petitioner’s] trip to
Afghanistan,” this was not enough to demonstrate membership without
some evidence of fighting or training.189 Courts also disagree about the
significance of lying about travel plans. In Uthman v. Obama,190 the court
found it highly suspicious that the petitioner had lied about the details of his
travel,191 while in Bensayah v. Obama,192 the court found that the
petitioner’s use of false travel documents was reasonable given his fear of
persecution if forced to return to his home country.193
2. Is It Possible To Disassociate from Al Qaeda or the Taliban?
One question that remains unclear in detention law is whether an
individual can effectively disassociate from Al Qaeda or the Taliban.194
The primary issue is whether an individual who was once a member of
these groups can effectively renounce his membership or sufficiently
distance himself so that he is no longer subject to detention. In Salahi v.
Obama,195 the detainee had sworn an oath of allegiance to Al Qaeda in
1991.196 As the court recognized, in 1991 “al-Qaida and the United States
shared a common objective: they both sought to topple Afghanistan’s
Communist government.”197 The detainee argued that he “severed all ties
with al-Qaida” in 1992 (well before Osama bin Laden issued his first fatwa
184. Uthman, 637 F.3d at 405 (“[A]ssociation with other al Qaeda members is itself
probative of al Qaeda membership.”).
185. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“That close association
made it far more likely that Al-Adahi was or became part of the organization.”).
186. Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
187. 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
188. Id. at 1106.
189. Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2009).
190. 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
191. Id. at 406 (“Uthman’s route to Afghanistan is even more suspicious because he lied
about how he paid for the trip.”).
192. 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
193. Id. at 727.
194. See Gregory S. McNeal, The Status Quo Bias and Counterterrorism Detention,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 855, 872 (2011).
195. 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
196. Id. at 751.
197. Id.
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against U.S. forces), and thus his capture and detention in 2001 was
unjustified.198 The court did not provide a clear legal standard for
evaluating claims of dissociation, and instead simply stated that a 1991 oath
to Al Qaeda , without more, was unlikely to justify detention.199 The case
was then remanded to the district court for further factfinding.200
One year later, the D.C. District Court provided more guidance on the
standard for dissociation. In Khairkhwa v. Obama,201 an Afghan national
and former senior Taliban official petitioned for habeas corpus because he
claimed, among other things, that he had dissociated from the Taliban by
the time of his capture and detention.202 The court acknowledged that “it is
not enough for the government to show simply that the petitioner was, at
one time, a member of the Taliban,” and “the petitioner must have been
‘part of’ [the Taliban] at the time of his capture.”203 The court, however,
did “not credit the petitioner’s contention that he had disassociated himself
from the Taliban prior to his capture.”204 The court held that the petitioner
made no meaningful attempt to surrender, and the fact that he “was
captured at the home of a hardline Taliban military commander greatly
undermines [his] contention that he had disassociated himself from the
Taliban prior to his apprehension.”205 The court noted that an individual
must take “affirmative actions” to demonstrate dissociation206 but did not
provide examples (other than fully surrendering)207 of these affirmative
acts. In Khalifh v. Obama,208 the court noted that disassociation could be
proven by affirmative actions or even a “compelling lengthy lapse in
activity.”209 The amount of time that qualifies as “lengthy” is still unclear.
B. “Substantial Support” As a Basis for Detention
Section 1021(b)(2) of the NDAA states that a “covered person” (who is
subject to detention) includes not only those who were “part of” Al Qaeda,
the Taliban, or associated forces but also those who “substantially

198. Id.
199. Id.; see also Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention
Policy and Political Reality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 246 (2012) (“Salahi stands for
the proposition that the government must prove that a detainee was ‘part of’ an enemy group
at the time of capture, and even if the individual was clearly ‘part of’ the group at an earlier
point, he need not prove overt acts of disassociation.”).
200. Salahi, 625 F.3d at 752.
201. 793 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2011).
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id. at 44.
204. Id. at 45.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 44.
207. Surrendering, however, may not be an attractive option because it might subject an
individual to indefinite detention.
208. No. 05-CV-1189, 2010 WL 2382925 (D.D.C. May 28, 2010).
209. Id. at *6 (referencing Salahi where there was a lapse in activity for about ten years);
see also Kuhn, supra note 199, at 248 (noting that a detainee’s ability to prove disassociation
without some affirmative act is very unlikely).
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supported” these groups.210 Although most courts agree that an individual
who is “part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban can be lawfully detained,211 courts
disagree over whether providing “substantial support” to these
organizations is a valid basis for detention. Thus, the “substantial support”
category raises two issues that often intersect: first, is substantial support a
valid basis for detention and, if so, what does it mean to provide substantial
support? These questions are discussed in turn below.
1. Is Substantial Support a Valid Predicate for Detention?
In 2009, two D.C. District Court opinions conflicted over whether
substantial support could serve as an independent basis for detention. In
Gherebi v. Obama,212 the court held that substantial support was a valid
basis for detention.213 The court limited its holding, however, to
individuals who provide substantial support as members of the enemy’s
armed forces and, therefore, mere “[s]ympathizers, propagandists, and
financiers” could not be detained.214 The court also appeared to equate
substantial support with the command structure test215—a test that the D.C.
Circuit later rejected.216
In contrast, in Hamlily v. Obama,217 the court rejected the concept of
support as an independent basis for detention.218 The court decided that
evidence of support could be used to demonstrate that an individual was
“part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban, but support was not its own distinct
detention category.219 This view was endorsed by another D.C. District
Court opinion in 2009.220 Although this court also held that detention
based on substantial support “is simply not authorized by the AUMF itself
or by the law of war,” the court specifically stated that “future domestic
legislation” might authorize detention based solely on substantial
Thus, the NDAA may have provided this legislative
support.221

210. NDAA § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
211. See supra Part II.A.
212. 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009).
213. Id. at 54 (“The Court therefore adopts the ‘substantial support’ standard employed
by the government as the governing standard for detention in these cases . . . .”).
214. Id. at 68–69.
215. Id. (“[Those] who have no involvement with this ‘command structure,’ while
perhaps members of the enemy organization in an abstract sense, cannot be considered part
of the enemy’s ‘armed forces’ and therefore cannot be detained militarily unless they take a
direct part in the hostilities.”).
216. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
217. 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009).
218. Id. at 69 (“Specifically, the Court rejects the concept of ‘substantial support’ as an
independent basis for detention.”).
219. Id. at 70.
220. See Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The President does not
have the authority to detain persons solely based on a determination that they substantially
supported the enemy armed forces.”).
221. Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
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authorization when it specifically enumerated “substantial support” as an
independent detention category.
In 2010, the D.C. Circuit partially resolved this lower court split by
holding that the Military Commissions Act of 2009222 provided
congressional authority to detain those who “purposefully and materially
supported hostilities.”223 Although this decision affirmed a separate
detention category based on support, it did not specifically authorize
detention based on “substantial support,”224 and no D.C. court has yet
evaluated the meaning of “substantial support” under the NDAA. The D.C.
Circuit had the opportunity to evaluate the meaning of “substantial support”
in 2011. However, because the court found that the detainee was clearly
“part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban, it never reached the substantial support
issue.225
Additionally, lawyers in the Obama Administration appear divided over
whether to use support as an independent legal justification for detention
when defending against habeas petitions. The government lawyers try to
avoid the issue, if possible, by first arguing that the detainee was “part of”
Al Qaeda or the Taliban.226
2. What Does It Mean To Provide Substantial Support?
Even among courts that agree that support is a valid independent
category for detention, there is little consensus about the meaning of
support or what activities qualify as “substantial support.”227 The D.C.
Circuit, while affirming detention based on material support, noted that it
was a “standard whose outer bounds are not readily identifiable.”228 The
meaning of “substantial support” is particularly unclear.229 Absent a
congressional definition of the term (which is lacking in the NDAA), courts
are forced to evaluate “substantial support” on a case-by-case, ad hoc
basis.230 One judge noted that this is problematic because the term is

222. Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. 18, 123 Stat. 2190, 2574–2614, (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a
(Supp. V 2011)).
223. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
224. It is unclear whether the concept of “substantial support” is different from “material
support.” This will be discussed further in the next section.
225. See Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d 11, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Nor need we consider
whether the detainee ‘substantially supported’ al Qaeda or the Taliban if we are persuaded
that he was ‘part of’ either entity.”).
226. See generally Charlie Savage, Obama Team Split on Tactics Against Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, at A1.
227. See Webber, supra note 33, at 186 (“There is no greater clarity about the meaning of
support.”).
228. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 873.
229. See Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that “the
government declines to provide any definition as to what the qualifier ‘substantial’ means”).
230. See id. at 69 (“[T]he exact contours of the standard must and will be fleshed out on a
case-by-case basis.”).
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“highly elastic” and could potentially cover everything from “core
membership and support to vague affiliation and cheerleading.”231
C. What Is an “Associated Force”?
The NDAA authorizes detention not only for persons who were a “part
of” or “substantially supported” Al Qaeda or the Taliban, but also for those
who were members of or substantially supported “associated forces” of
these two organizations. Although there are some easy cases, determining
whether a particular group (even an admitted terrorist organization) is an
“associated force” of Al Qaeda or the Taliban can be difficult. This is
especially true for Al Qaeda, a loosely organized group that has many
affiliates and splinter groups.232
In 2009, the D.C. District Court in Hamlily affirmed the government’s
power to detain members of associated forces and defined the concept of an
associated force as a “co-belligerent,” or a group that has become a “fully
fledged belligerent fighting in association with one or more belligerent
powers.”233 The court recognized that it was applying the term “cobelligerent” by analogy, because the concept came from the law of war and
was usually applied in international armed conflicts involving nationstates.234 The court also limited the definition of an associated force to
those organizations that have an “actual association in the current conflict
with al Qaeda or the Taliban,” and excluded groups that only “share an
abstract philosophy or even a common purpose with al Qaeda.”235 The
Hamlily decision addressed threshold legal questions for a number of
different detainees, and thus no specific organizations were identified as
“associated forces.”236
Courts seem to faithfully apply the definition of “associated forces”
established in Hamlily, limiting it those groups that actually fought
alongside Al Qaeda or the Taliban. The 55th Arab Brigade237 and the
Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin,238 for example, were found to be associated
forces, and both organizations were actively involved in the conflict in
Afghanistan.239 Parhat v. Gates240 is one of the only cases where the court
231. Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 884 (Williams, J., concurring).
232. See Cronogue, supra note 14, at 381 (“However, demarcating exactly where the alQaeda organization ends and one of its ‘affiliates’ or ‘associated forces’ begins is extremely
difficult. For example, al-Qaeda now has many branches and affiliates in Yemen and Saudi
Arabia.”).
233. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2009) (citation omitted).
234. Id. at 74 n.16.
235. Id. at 75 n.17.
236. Id. at 66.
237. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
238. See Khan v. Obama, 655 F.3d 20, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
239. See Chester H.L. Hutchinson, Note, Al-Bihani v. Obama & Congressional
Testimony on Targeted Killings: Evaluating Custom As a Source of Law in the War on
Terror, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 579, 600 (2012) (noting that the 55th Arab Brigade was
“a para-military group allied with the Taliban which included al Qaeda members within its
command structure”); see also Steve Breyman & Aneel Salman, Reaping the Whirlwind:
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determined that an organization was not an associated force.241 In Parhat,
the court held that the government failed to show that the East Turkistan
Islamic Movement (ETIM) had any connection to Al Qaeda or the Taliban
or that the ETIM was planning “terrorist activities against U.S. interests.”242
Thus, courts have limited the definition of an “associated force” to those
groups that actually engage in joint activities with Al Qaeda and the
Taliban.
III. HEDGES CHALLENGES THE DETENTION AUTHORITY OF THE NDAA
On January 13, 2012, a group of plaintiffs brought a lawsuit in the
Southern District of New York seeking injunctive relief against section
1021 of the NDAA, claiming that it violated both their First and Fifth
Amendment rights.243
Because they were challenging a detention
provision, these plaintiffs were unusual, as they were not detainees but
writers and political activists.244 The plaintiffs included a Pulitzer Prize–
winning journalist, a website founder, and even a member of the Icelandic
Parliament.245
On May 16, 2012, Judge Forrest granted a preliminary injunction against
section 1021246 and then, on September 12, 2012, permanently enjoined
section 1021(b)(2).247 Judge Forrest held that this portion of the statute was
“unconstitutionally overbroad” because the government failed to show “that
activities protected by the First Amendment could not subject an individual
to indefinite military detention under § 1021(b)(2).”248 Judge Forrest also
stated that the “due process rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
require that an individual understand what conduct might subject him or her
to criminal or civil penalties.”249 Because the government failed to
adequately define key terms like “substantially supported” and “associated

Pakistani Counterinsurgency Campaigns, 2004–2010, 34 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 65
(2010) (stating that Hezb-i-Islami is an Afghan insurgent group whose members often seek
sanctuary in Pakistan).
240. 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
241. Id. at 848. This case was actually decided under the review authority provided in the
DTA and before the Supreme Court granted the right of habeas corpus to detainees at
Guantanamo Bay in Boumdiene.
242. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 848.
243. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 1721124, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May
16, 2012).
244. Id. at *6.
245. Id. at *6, *8, *11.
246. Id. at *28.
247. See Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2012). Section 1021(b)(2) of the NDAA defines “covered persons” who were not
directly related to the 9/11 attacks.
248. Id.
249. Id. at *2. Judge Forrest noted that the “stakes get no higher” than section 1021
because of the risk of “indefinite military detention—potential detention during a war on
terrorism that is not expected to end in the foreseeable future, if ever.” Id.
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forces,” the “statute’s vagueness falls short of what due process
requires.”250
This part uses Judge Forrest’s analysis in Hedges as a vehicle for
examining the contours of executive detention in general and of section
1021 of the NDAA in particular. The Hedges case is somewhat of an
outlier because it involves individuals challenging a detention statute who
are not currently detained and probably do not face a realistic, imminent
threat of detention. The government has appealed the ruling, and the
Second Circuit may overrule Judge Forrest on a procedural issue such as
standing.251 Nonetheless, Judge Forrest raised important concerns about
section 1021 and executive detention, which are addressed below.
A. Does Section 1021 Extend Detention Authority Beyond the AUMF?
As discussed in Part I, disagreement exists over whether section 1021
creates any new detention authority or simply affirms the authority of the
AUMF. The text of the statute states, “Nothing in this section is intended to
limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of the
[AUMF].”252 However, the AUMF never mentions detention, and the
limits of detention authority under the AUMF have been defined on a caseby-case basis after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi.253
The government has continued to argue on appeal that section 1021
simply affirms the AUMF and “does not confer any new detention
authority.”254 But Judge Forrest found many significant differences
between section 1021 and the AUMF.255 She highlighted four major
reasons why the detention authority granted in section 1021 goes beyond
the AUMF: (1) it is an ex post facto fix to justify past detentions; (2) it
incorporates the laws of war for the first time; (3) it is not tied to the 9/11
attacks; and (4) it is not limited to individuals captured on the battlefield.
Each of these points are discussed in turn below.

250. Id.
251. The Second Circuit has granted a stay of the injunction pending resolution of the
appeal. See Hedges v. Obama, Nos. 12-3176 (L), 12-3644(Con), 2012 WL 4075626 (2d Cir.
Sept. 17, 2012). The Second Circuit heard oral arguments on February 6, 2013, and a
decision is expected in the coming months. See Michael Kelley, Lawyer Sums Up the
Enormous Stakes of the NDAA Indefinite Detention Lawsuit, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 7, 2013),
http://www.businessinsider.com/stakes-of-indefinite-detention-lawsuit-2013-2. The Second
Circuit may find that the plaintiffs lack standing, especially considering recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013)
(holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge national security legislation because
their future injuries were too speculative and were not “certainly impending”).
252. NDAA § 1021(d), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
253. See supra Part II.
254. Brief for the Appellants at 15, Hedges v. Obama, Nos. 12-3176, 12-3644 (2d Cir.
Nov. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Government Appellate Brief], available at http://www.lawfare
blog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Hedges-Opening-Brief.FINAL_.FILED_.pdf.
255. See Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *4 (“The AUMF and § 1021 have significant
differences.”).
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First, Judge Forrest viewed section 1021 as an “ex post facto ‘fix,’” or an
attempt by the President and Congress to “ratify past detentions which may
have occurred under an overly-broad interpretation of the AUMF.”256 She
stated that, at some point, the executive branch unilaterally extended its
detention authority beyond the AUMF, and section 1021 was an attempt to
codify that extension.257 In support of this view, she cited a 2009 brief to
the D.C. District Court in which she claimed that the government changed
its position to resemble the authority granted in section 1021(b)(2).258
In that brief, the government stated that it was “refining its position” and
providing a “new explication of who may be detained.”259 Additionally,
the description of the government’s detention authority in the brief is almost
identical to section 1021(b), including the categories of “substantial
support” and “associated forces.”260 However, even though the government
admitted it was modifying its position, it argued that this new position still
derived from and was consistent with the AUMF.261
As discussed in Part II, most of the substantive limits of detention
authority under the AUMF have been defined by the D.C. courts.262 These
courts have in many cases upheld the government’s interpretation of
detention authority under the AUMF,263 while in other cases they have
limited or narrowed that authority.264 The government argues that the
detention authority granted by the AUMF should not be determined by
evaluating the text of the AUMF in a vacuum, but rather courts should look
at how the AUMF has evolved over time through interpretation by all three
branches of government.265
The government further contends that section 1021 “is an essentially
verbatim affirmation by Congress of the Executive Branch’s interpretation
of the AUMF.”266 Thus, the government argues that section 1021
256. Id. at *4. But see Senators Amici Brief, supra note 22, at 16–17 (arguing that Judge
Forrest’s articulation of a hidden agenda is contrary to both the legislative history and the
President’s signing statement).
257. Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *4; see also Plaintiffs-Appellees Brief, supra note
149, at 4.
258. Hedges, 2012 WL3999839, at *4.
259. Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, 11, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee
Litig., Misc. No. 08-442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Brief], available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf.
260. See id. at 2.
261. See id. at 1.
262. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; see also Barnes, supra note 18, at 81
(“[T]he D.C. . . . courts have been the main actors addressing the AUMF’s scope.”).
263. See supra Part II.C (explaining that the D.C. courts have affirmed the executive’s
authority to detain members of “associated forces”).
264. See supra Part II.A–B (explaining that the D.C. courts have disagreed over how to
determine if an individual is “part of” Al Qaeda and whether detention can be based on
“support”).
265. See Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 5–9.
266. Id. at 8; see also Senators Amici Brief, supra note 22, at 2 (“That process culminated
in the Obama Administration’s March 2009 Memorandum setting forth the detention
authority that had been exercised by the executive branch to that point and Congress’s
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represents congressional ratification of the current interpretation of
detention authority developed by the executive and the D.C. courts.267 But,
Judge Forrest determined that section 1021 was a congressional attempt to
defer to the executive and validate or fix past detentions that went beyond
the scope of the AUMF.268
Second, Judge Forrest stated that section 1021 goes beyond the AUMF
because it explicitly incorporates the law of war.269 She stated that the
government used these “vague ‘law of war’ principles” to support “an
expansive interpretation of detention authority under the AUMF.”270 The
text of the AUMF does not mention the laws of war, but the laws of war
have often been used to interpret the AUMF. The Supreme Court used the
laws of war to determine that the “necessary and appropriate force”
language in the AUMF included the power of executive detention.271
Additionally, scholars have argued that since the AUMF involves warfare
and the use of force, the laws of war are the best way to interpret the
statute.272
However, in Al-Bihani v. Obama,273 the D.C. Circuit stated that the laws
of war are “fluid” and “not a fixed code” and should not be used to
“determine the limits of the President’s war powers.”274 Judge Forrest cited
the Al-Bihani case to support her position that the laws of war should not be
used to interpret the AUMF.275 The government has argued on appeal in its
brief to the Second Circuit that Al-Bihani is not applicable because that
court ruled that a detainee could not invoke the laws of war to limit the
President’s war powers, while Judge Forrest felt that invoking the laws of
war are a means to expand the President’s war powers.276 Thus, Judge
ratification of that authority in Section 1021 of the [NDAA].”); Stephen Consuegra,
Comment, Under the Lens of the Constitution: The NDAA’s Detainee Provisions and the
Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 25 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 105, 127–28
(2012).
267. See Senators Amici Brief, supra note 22, at 32 (“The district court’s wholesale
rejection of the detention authority affirmed by § 1021 disregards and disrespects the
opinions of all three branches of the Federal Government . . . .”).
268. See Landau, supra note 58, at 696 (noting that often “the judiciary refuses to accede
to a process marked by congressional abdication.”). If section 1021 is a verbatim repetition
of the executive’s position, that could be viewed by Judge Forrest as a congressional
abdication of responsibility.
269. See Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *15 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2012) (“[Section] 1021 adds a new element not previously set forth in the AUMF
. . . the addition of the ‘law of war’ language.”).
270. Id.
271. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
272. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2091 (“[T]he AUMF should be read as
authorizing the President to do what the laws of war permit.”).
273. 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
274. Id. at 871.
275. See Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *17.
276. See Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 27 n.4; see also Senators Amici
Brief, supra note 22, at 19 (“Incorporation of the law of war would, if anything, serve to
limit, not expand, the President’s potential authority under the AUMF.”). See generally
Christine Waring, The Removal of International Law from Guantanamo Detainee Litigation:
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Forrest and the D.C. Circuit seem to agree that the laws of war should not
be used by the courts, although possibly for opposite reasons. Further
complicating the issue, in denying a rehearing en banc, seven judges of the
D.C. Circuit stated that the discussion of the laws of war in Al-Bihani was
dicta and “not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”277
Third, Judge Forrest stated that section 1021 goes beyond the AUMF
because the AUMF was specifically tied to 9/11 and section 1021 is not.278
The text and timing (September 18, 2001) of the AUMF suggest that it was
a response to 9/11.279 Judge Forrest held that section 1021 goes beyond the
scope of the AUMF by creating a second category of “covered persons.”280
The first category of covered persons in section 1021(b)(1) is essentially a
verbatim repetition of the language in the AUMF. In section 1021(b)(2)
(the portion that Judge Forrest ruled unconstitutional), the statute
specifically names Al Qaeda and the Taliban (not mentioned in the AUMF)
and creates detention categories based on “substantial support” and
“associated forces.”281
Although Judge Forrest believes that the AUMF should be limited to
9/11, prominent scholars have argued for a more expansive interpretation of
the AUMF that includes “associated forces” of Al Qaeda and those who
provide support to these groups.282 Additionally, as previously discussed,
the scope and meaning of the AUMF has evolved over time through
executive and judicial interpretation.283 Although the AUMF may have
been limited to the 9/11 attacks in 2001, that may no longer be true in
today, where it still serves as the primary congressional authorization for
the fight against Al Qaeda.284

Problems and Implications of Al-Bihani v. Obama, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 927, 930 (2012) (“AlBihani created precedent that removed international law as a limit to the President’s
detention authority . . . .”).
277. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir 2010).
278. See Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839 at *14 (stating that “the AUMF set forth detention
authority tied directly and only to September 11, 2001”).
279. See supra notes 10, 11 and accompanying text.
280. See Plaintiffs-Appellees Brief, supra note 149, at 5 (“[T]he district court held that
§ 1021(B)(2) authorizes ‘for the first time,’ the President to detain without reference to
participation in the events of September 11, 2001 . . . .”).
281. See NDAA § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
282. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2055 (“[T]he AUMF nonetheless
encompasses terrorist organizations other than those responsible for the September 11
attacks if they have a sufficiently close connection with the responsible organizations.”).
But some of these scholars are now advocating for Congress to create a new statute to serve
as the legal foundation for America’s counter-terrorism efforts. See JACK GOLDSMITH ET AL.,
A STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR NEXT-GENERATION TERRORIST THREATS (2013), available at
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/Statutory-Framework-for-NextGeneration-Terrorist-Threats.pdf.
283. See supra notes 147, 148 and accompanying text.
284. See Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against AlQaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (stating that the government still uses the AUMF “as
the legal authority to prosecute its military campaign against al-Qaeda.”); see also
Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 2.
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Fourth, Judge Forrest stated that section 1021 goes beyond the AUMF
because detention under the AUMF is limited to the battlefield based on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi.285 In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor stated
that the purpose of detention was to “ensur[e] that those who have in fact
fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the
United States.”286 Thus, one view of Hamdi is that it limits the detention
authority of the AUMF to those who fought and were captured on the
battlefield.287
Commentators have argued, however, that the fight against Al Qaeda
and other terrorist organizations is an unconventional conflict, and thus the
“battlefield lacks a precise geographic location and arguably includes the
United States.”288 Additionally, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
stated that, “[t]his campaign against al Qaeda will largely take place outside
declared combat zones.”289 The government disagrees with Judge Forrest’s
narrow reading of Hamdi and believes that, under the AUMF, Al Qaeda
members can be detained wherever they are captured, regardless of whether
it is on a traditional battlefield.290
B. Should Section 1021(b)(2) Be Voided for Vagueness?
Judge Forrest held that section 1021(b)(2) violated the Fifth Amendment
because it is vague,291 and thus fails to provide notice of what conduct may
subject an individual to detention.292 Throughout the opinion, Judge
Forrest criticized not only the statute itself but also the government’s
litigation position because it was a moving target,293 and it failed to provide
any specific definitions of contested terms like “substantially supported”
285. See Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331 (KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *15 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2012) (“The Supreme Court made it clear that its view of the AUMF related to
detention on the field of battle.”); see also Plaintiffs-Appellees Brief, supra note 149, at 3.
286. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004).
287. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the “narrowness” of the holding in Hamdi and limiting it to those captured on
the battlefield); see also Landau, supra note 58, at 692 n.150 (stating that the decision in
Hamdi “effectively made battlefield capture a prerequisite to executive detention”).
288. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2049.
289. Larry Shaughnessy, Panetta: America Beating al Qaeda but Hasn’t Won Yet, CNN
(Nov. 20, 2012), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/20/panetta-america-beating-al-qaeda
-but-hasnt-won-yet/?iref=allsearch.
290. See Senators Amici Brief, supra note 22, at 22 (“[T]here is no requirement that a
detainee be captured on any particular ‘field of battle’—a particularly inappropriate
limitation for an authorization of force against terrorist entities that operate worldwide.”).
291. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
12, 2012) (“The statute’s vagueness falls short of what due process requires.”).
292. Id. at *40 (“People of common intelligence must not have to guess at the meaning of
a statute that may subject them to penalties.”).
293. Id. at *12 (“There is no guarantee that the position will not—or cannot—change
again.”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Bill of Rights Defense Committee in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmation at 9–11, Hedges v. Obama, Nos. 12-3176(L), 12-3644
(2d Cir. Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://www.bordc.org/resources/hedgesamicus.pdf
(arguing that the government’s changing litigation position is a calculated effort to avoid
substantive judicial review of detention practices).
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and “associated forces.”294 The government essentially conceded the
vagueness of these terms,295 and Judge Forrest stated that they had not been
adequately defined by previous case law.296
The government argued in Hedges—and continues to argue on appeal—
that force authorizations and military statutes, like the AUMF and section
1021, should not be subject to vagueness review by the courts.297 This is
because, as the Supreme Court has explained, “Congress—in giving the
Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs—must of necessity paint
with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas.”298
Additionally, the government stated that the terms in section 1021 should
not have fixed and rigid definitions, but should be evaluated on a case-bycase basis.299 Judge Forrest rejected this argument and equated section
1021 with a criminal statute because it permits an individual to be
indefinitely imprisoned.300 The problem was further compounded, as Judge
Forrest noted, by the lack of a scienter element in the statute, meaning that
an individual could be detained without any “knowing conduct.”301
Some scholars and commentators agree with Judge Forrest that the terms
used in section 1021(b)(2) are impermissibly vague.302 They believe that
terms like “substantial support” and “associated forces” are ambiguous at
best303 and, at worst, allow for the possibility of abuse or manipulation.304
294. Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *2 (“[T]he Government nevertheless did not provide
particular defintions.”).
295. Id. at *41.
296. Id. at *43 (“The terms as used in § 1021(b)(2) have not been previously defined in
case law.”).
297. See Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 3 (“[A] statute authorizing the
use of military force in broad terms is not subject to . . . challenge for being
unconstitutionally vague.”); see also Senators Amici Brief, supra note 22, at 3–4
(“[A]uthorizations for exercise of the war power—as opposed to the exercise of that power
in specific circumstances—have never been subject to review for vagueness because they
structure the operations of the government and, unlike statutes creating criminal offenses, do
not work directly on individuals or impair individuals’ rights.”).
298. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
299. See 2009 Brief, supra note 259, at 2.
300. See Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *41–42 (“A citizen has just as much interest—
indeed, perhaps more—in understanding what conduct could subject him or her to indefinite
military detention without a trial as he or she does in understanding the parameters of a
traditional criminal statute that carries a statutory maximum term of imprisonment and
cannot be enforced in the absence of full criminal due process rights.”).
301. Id. at *43.
302. See Glenn Greenwald, PolitiFact and the Scam of Neutral Expertise, SALON (Dec. 5,
2011),
http://www.salon.com/2011/12/05/politifact_and_the_scam_of_neutral_expertise/
(noting that people like Congressman Ron Paul and law professor Jonathan Hafetz have
objected to the language used in section 1021).
303. See Webber, supra note 33, at 203 (“The definitions of ‘part of’ and ‘substantial
support’ are not clear.”); see also Cronogue, supra note 14, at 397 (“[T]he proposal also adds
the ambiguous terms ‘associated forces’ and ‘substantially supporting’ . . . . [T]he breadth
and scope of these terms seemingly depends on the Executive’s determination and framing
of the conflict.”).
304. See Greenwald, supra note 100, at 3 (stating that the terms “substantially supports”
and “associated forces” are “extremely vague terms subject to wild and obvious levels of
abuse”).

2013]

A MORE MEANINGFUL DETENTION STATUTE

2889

The government has argued, however, that congressional statutes relating to
national security must be vague, and that it is the responsibility of the
President as Commander-in-Chief (and not the courts) to interpret and
execute them.305 Below, the terms “substantial support” and “associated
forces” are analyzed in the context of Hedges, the definitions provided by
the government on appeal, and similar statutes.
In Hedges, the government failed to define “substantial support” or to
provide any examples demonstrating what the term means.306 The
government also failed to provide a definition of the term when pressed by
the D.C. District Court three years earlier.307 The plaintiffs in Hedges
argue that the addition of the term “substantial support” in section
1021(b)(2) is a clear attempt to extend detention authority beyond the
AUMF and to make it easier for the government to justify questionable
detentions.308
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the government has now provided a
definition of substantial support that is shaped by the laws of war and the
Geneva Conventions and includes individuals who “bear sufficiently close
ties to those forces and provide them support that warrants their detention in
prosecution of the conflict.”309 The government lists examples of
supporting individuals who can be detained under the Geneva Conventions,
but these examples seem more relevant to conventional conflicts with
nation-states and less applicable to the unconventional fight against
terrorism.310
Even with the government’s new definition, there is still potential
uncertainty about the type and level of support sufficient to subject an
individual to detention.311 In contrast, in the criminal statute that proscribes
“providing material support to terrorists,” there is a thorough definition of
material support and examples of prohibited activities.312 The examples
provide clear notice of what type of conduct is illegal,313 and the statute
even further defines terms like “training” and “expert advice or
305. See Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 17.
306. Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *12 (“In particular, when the Court asked for one
example of what ‘substantially support’ means, the Government stated, ‘I’m not in a position
to give one specific example.’”).
307. See supra note 229 and accompanying text; see also Plaintiffs-Appellees Brief,
supra note 149, at 9 (“[Section] 1021(b)(2) leaves the term ‘substantially supported’
completely undefined (and it is defined nowhere else in any federal statute).”).
308. See Plaintiffs-Appellees Brief, supra note 149, at 15–20.
309. Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 27–28.
310. See id. at 28 (stating that individuals can be detained if they are “civilian members of
military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units”).
311. See Cronogue, supra note 14, at 397 (“Is there a threshold level of support beyond
which we call it ‘substantial’?”).
312. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–2339B (2006).
313. See id. § 2339A(b)(1) (examples of illegal conduct include providing “financial
services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel (1 or more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except
medicine or religious materials”).
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assistance.”314 The material support statute was recently challenged for
(among other things) vagueness, but the Supreme Court held that it was not
vague because of the internal definitions.315 The material support statute
also has a scienter element (the support must be “knowingly” provided),316
which the Supreme Court held “further reduces any potential for
vagueness.”317 Section 1021 lacks both internal definitions and a scienter
element.318
Judge Forrest also found that the term “associated forces” was vague,
although she recognized that Congress could easily remedy the vagueness
of the term by providing further clarification.319 Without a definition, it is
unclear how closely an organization must be tied to Al Qaeda or the Taliban
to be considered an associated force.320 On appeal, the government has
provided a definition of an “associated force” that has two characteristics:
“(1) an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside alQaeda, [that] (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against the
United States or its coalition partners.”321 This is a narrow definition that
incorporates the law of war concept of cobelligerency.322 It excludes
advocacy organizations that are not “armed groups,” and it even excludes
armed organizations that do not “fight alongside al Qaeda.”323 This new
definition may eliminate many of the vagueness concerns expressed by
Judge Forrest in Hedges.
C. First Amendment Issues
This Note does not address the substantive First Amendment issues that
were discussed at length in Hedges, and instead focuses on the scope of
detention authority and Fifth Amendment issues. Thus, this Note does not
evaluate whether an individual could be detained under section 1021 for
activities protected by the First Amendment or whether that makes the
statute unconstitutional. However, it is worth mentioning that in similar
314. See id. § 2339A(b)(2)–(3).
315. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010) (“Congress
also took care to add narrowing definitions to the material-support statute over time. These
definitions increased the clarity of the statute’s terms.”).
316. 18 U.S.C. § 2239B(a)(1).
317. Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2720.
318. See Plaintiffs-Appellees Brief, supra note 149, at 7, 48 (noting that section
1021(b)(2) does not require conduct to be “purposeful” and “contains no definitions of any
kind”).
319. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *43 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2012) (“‘[A]ssociated forces’ is an undefined, moving target, subject to change and
subjective judgment. It would be very straightforward for Congress to alleviate this
vagueness by tethering the term to a definition of (for instance) specific organizations.”).
320. See Cronogue, supra note 14, at 403 (“Associated force could mean many things and
apply to groups with varying levels of involvement.”); see also Webber, supra note 33, at
203.
321. Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 30.
322. A D.C. District Court also used the concept of cobelligerency to define associated
forces in Hamlily. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
323. Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 30.
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statutes, Congress has made more of an effort to avoid First Amendment
concerns. For example, in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the statute that criminalizes
providing material support to terrorists, there is a “Rule of Construction”
that states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed or applied so as to
abridge the exercise of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.”324
The material support statute also excludes independent advocacy, which
convinced the Supreme Court that Congress had carefully considered
constitutional issues and thus deserved deference from the Court.325 A
provision excluding independent advocacy could alleviate the concerns of
many journalists and activists whose activities are not “directed to,
coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”326 Unlike the
material support statute, section 1021 does not contain a First Amendment
savings clause or any exclusion of independent advocacy.327
D. Separation of Powers Concerns
In Hedges, Judge Forrest emphasized that although “courts undoubtedly
owe the political branches a great deal of deference in the area of national
security,” courts cannot abdicate their responsibility to safeguard the
Constitution.328 The Supreme Court echoed this view in Hamdi when, even
though it affirmed executive detention, the plurality stated that “war is not a
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s
citizens.”329 It appears that the concept of complete deference to the
executive in foreign affairs has mostly fallen out of favor,330 although it still
has some advocates.331
Given that the courts have a role in overseeing the President’s national
security decisions,332 congressional statutes like section 1021 have the
324. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) (2006). This is often referred to as a First Amendment “saving
clause.” See Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *19.
325. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010) (“Finally,
and most importantly, Congress has avoided any restriction on independent advocacy, or
indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated with, or controlled by foreign terrorist
groups.”).
326. Id. But see Plaintiffs-Appellees Brief, supra note 149, at 33 (arguing that “the
‘independent’ advocacy standard gives the government virtually free reign in regulating
speech”).
327. See Plaintiffs-Appellees Brief, supra note 149, at 9 (noting that section 1021 lacks a
“First Amendment saving clause”).
328. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
12, 2012).
329. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
330. See Landau, supra note 58, at 671 n.49 (stating that the Supreme Court has
“resoundingly rejected” the unitary executive theory); see also Johnsen, supra note 50, at
495 (“Few commentators continue to defend absolute (or near-absolute) deference of the
kind described in Curtiss-Wright”).
331. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J, dissenting).
332. For two conflicting views on the degree of deference that courts should afford the
President’s national security decisions, compare Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal,
Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007) (arguing for more robust
judicial review), with Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (arguing for a very deferential approach).
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ability to either expand or restrict executive war powers. According to
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework, when the President acts pursuant
to clear congressional authorization, he is in Zone 1, where his authority is
the greatest and he has the full power of the federal government.333 When
congressional intent is unclear or unknown, the President is in Zone 2 or the
“zone of twilight,” and he has less authority than in Zone 1.334
Thus, there at least two ways to interpret section 1021 under Justice
Jackson’s framework. The government believes that section 1021 places
the executive firmly in Zone 1. It has argued on appeal in Hedges that
section 1021 is “an essentially verbatim affirmation by Congress of the
Executive Branch’s interpretation of the AUMF.”335 This is supported by
the government’s 2009 brief to the D.C. District Court, which is almost
identical to the description of detention authority in section 1021.336 If
section 1021 places the President in Zone 1, he has clear statutory
authorization and does not need to rely on his general Commander-in-Chief
powers (which courts view more narrowly).337 Additionally, in Zone 1, any
ambiguities or vague terms in the statute might actually expand the
President’s authority.338
An alternative way to view section 1021 is that, although Congress
appeared to affirm the President’s authority, it did so with a vague and
unclear statute. If it is difficult to determine what Congress actually
intended, this could place the President in Zone 2.339 Judge Forrest held
that terms in section 1021, like “substantial support” and “associated
forces,” are vague, and thus it is unclear what authority Congress actually
delegated to the President. Judge Forrest stated that there is no “loophole
through which the legislative and executive branches could create immunity
from judicial oversight simply by having Congress provide broad,

333. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
335. Government Appellate Brief, supra note 254, at 8; see also Senators Amici Brief,
supra note 22, at 2–3 (“Congress sought to endorse the specific detention authority that had
been exercised by the executive and approved by the courts and thereby place it on the
strongest possible constitutional footing, consistent with Youngstown.”); Benjamin Wittes,
Raha Wala Writes His Own FAQ, LAWFARE (Dec. 20, 2011, 10:01PM), http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2011/12/raha-wala-writes-his-own-faq/ (“[B]ecause the NDAA (unlike the
2001 AUMF) authorizes the detention of members and ‘substantial supporters’ of not only al
Qaeda but its ‘associated forces,’ the President’s authority to indefinitely detain such
individuals ‘is at its maximum.’” (quoting Raha Wala)).
336. See supra notes 259–60 and accompanying text.
337. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2051–52 (noting that courts are more
reluctant to evaluate the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers, attempting, “whenever
possible, to decide difficult questions of wartime authority on the basis of what Congress has
in fact authorized”).
338. See Chesney, supra note 33, at 792–93 (explaining that some observers view
ambiguities in detention statutes as constituting “an implied delegation of authority to the
executive to provide whatever further criteria may be required”).
339. See generally Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 15, at 2133 (noting that in the
context of the War on Terror, “it is essential to determine what Congress has, and has not,
authorized”).
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undefined authorization.”340 If congressional statutes are too vague or too
broad when delegating power to the President, courts may determine that
Congress has abdicated its role in the political process, and thus the courts
are less likely to be deferential.341
E. Detention of U.S. Citizens
Based on the text of the statute, section 1021 does not alter the legal
landscape regarding the detention of American citizens.342 As previously
mentioned, section 1021(e)343 states that “Nothing in this section shall be
construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of
United States citizens.”344 Thus, Judge Forrest’s claim that “§ 1021(b)(2)
provides for indefinite military detention of anyone—including U.S.
citizens—without trial”345 must be based on the belief that American
citizens could be indefinitely detained before section 1021 was passed.
Judge Forrest’s view is supported by the Supreme Court, which stated in
Hamdi that American citizens can be held as enemy combatants.346
However, the Obama Administration has stated that it will not detain
American citizens indefinitely without trial.347
Thus, the current situation is that the Supreme Court has authorized the
detention of American citizens, President Obama claims not to exercise that
authority, and Congress has chosen not to address the issue. Senator
Feinstein proposed a new amendment (Feinstein Amendment II) to the
2013 NDAA that would have forbidden the detention of American citizens
or lawful permanent residents without express congressional
authorization.348 The amendment was approved by the Senate, but did not
340. Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *31 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2012).
341. See Landau, supra note 58, at 688–89 (stating that courts will step in when they
perceive insufficient coordinate branch decision making between Congress and the
executive); see also Katyal, supra note 75, at 115–16 (noting that, when Congress fails to
check the executive, “the judiciary is called upon to singlehandedly rein in excesses”).
342. See Recent Legislation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1877 (2012) (“The section,
however, expressly avoids taking a position on the contentious question of whether U.S.
citizens . . . may be detained.”).
343. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
344. The NDAA section 1021(e) also states that existing law is not affected in regards to
“lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are captured or
arrested in the United States.” NDAA § 1021(e), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). The scope of
indefinite detention has important consequences for immigration law, but this topic is not
addressed in this Note.
345. Hedges, 2012 WL 3999839, at *31.
346. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
347. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Consuegra, supra note 266, at
140 (arguing that the disparate treatment of citizens and aliens raises equal protection
concerns).
348. See Michael Kelley, There’s a Giant Loophole in the Feinstein Amendment to the
NDAA, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/feinstein-ndaaamendment-indefinite-detention-2012-11.
The article explains, however, that many
congressmen feel that the AUMF provides express congressional authorization to detain
American citizens, and thus Feinstein Amendment II would have no practical effect.
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make it into the final version of the bill.349 With the exclusion of the
Feinstein Amendment II from the 2013 NDAA, Congress still remains
silent on the issue of indefinite executive detention of American citizens.
IV. REVISING SECTION 1021 AND CREATING A NEW,
MORE MEANINGFUL DETENTION STATUTE
This part recommends ways to improve section 1021, with the goal of
creating a clearer, more meaningful detention statute. In section 1021,
Congress simply codified verbatim the executive branch’s interpretation of
detention authority.350 Congress failed to define or limit key terms like
“substantial support” or “associated forces,” and thus abdicated its role in
shaping the substantive parameters of executive detention. This section
recommends ways to improve a future detention statute and includes some
proposed definitions of key detention criteria.
A vague and unclear detention statute harms the separation of powers
between the three branches. As Justice Jackson’s widely accepted
Youngstown framework explains,351 executive war powers are relational to
Congress, and the judiciary decides what Congress has or has not
authorized—thus all three branches have a role. Vague statutes enhance the
power of the judiciary at the expense of the legislature for two reasons.
First, vague statutes make congressional intent unclear and give the courts
significant discretion to determine if the President is in Zone 1, 2, or 3.352
Second, vague statutes invite close judicial scrutiny because they
demonstrate to the courts that the political process has failed.353 Thus,
vague congressional authorizations that attempt to delegate broad authority
to the President can be counterproductive because, instead of empowering
the President, they actually empower the courts.354
In addition to expanding the role of the judiciary, vague statutes create
uncertainty for the executive. The President cannot act quickly and
decisively if the limits of his authority are unclear.355 Finally, Congress
plays an important role in detention policy, and vague statutes like section

349. See Robert Chesney, Agreement Reached on the NDAA, LAWFARE (Dec. 18, 2012,
11:35 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/12/agreement-reached-on-the-ndaa.
350. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
351. See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 87, 89–90 (2002). Even while criticizing Jackson’s concurrence, the author notes
that it is supported by the weight of scholarship. Id.
352. See Katyal, supra note 75, at 99–100 (“Under Youngstown, whether a given case
falls within a particular zone depends on statutory construction. But the Court can toggle
between categories depending on its stinginess or generosity with any given statute. . . .”).
353. See supra note 341 and accompanying text.
354. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 332, at 1199 (arguing for more detailed
congressional legislation to constrain the President instead of more judicial review). But see
Jinks & Katyal, supra note 332, at 1279 (countering that judicial review will lead to more
congressional action because Congress can trust the courts to check abuse by the executive).
355. See Cronogue, supra note 14, at 392.
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1021 represent a congressional abdication of that role.356 Congressional
legislation is essential when creating long-term, effective antiterrorism
policies that have a solid legal foundation.357 This Note recommends
substantive changes to section 1021 to make it a clearer, more meaningful
congressional statement about the limits of indefinite executive detention.
The major recommendations are: (1) move away from the AUMF;
(2) provide specific definitions of key terms (proposed definitions are
suggested); (3) exclude protected First Amendment activities; and
(4) include a clear statement about the indefinite detention of American
citizens.
A. Move Away from the AUMF
The AUMF is the foundational legal authorization for both the overall
fight against terrorism358 and post-9/11 executive detention.359 However,
the AUMF, which is over ten years old, makes no mention of detention,360
and lower courts are constantly reinterpreting it on a case-by-case basis
without meaningful guidance from Congress.361 This Note does not argue
that the AUMF itself should be repealed or replaced.362 Even if the AUMF
remains the background authorization for the use of force, Congress needs
to pass a specific detention statute that can be understood independent of
the AUMF.363 Congress failed to do this with section 1021 when it stated
that, “Nothing in this section is intended to limit or expand the authority of
the President or the scope of the [AUMF].”364 If a detention statute cannot
be interpreted independent of the AUMF, the statute will create more
confusion than clarity.365 A meaningful detention statute must establish
356. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 332, at 1276–77 (arguing that there is a “democratic
deficit” in the legal War on Terror because “the President has been acting without the
explicit support of the legislature”); see also Recent Legislation, supra note 342, at 1883
(“Congress not only legitimates and helps make accountable executive branch actions, but it
is also the only branch capable of fashioning a comprehensive legal regime for military
detention of terrorist suspects.”).
357. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 122–23 (2009); see also JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT:
THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 183–84 (2012) (noting that Congress has
effectively constrained many of the President’s wartime powers after 9/11).
358. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
362. However, some commentators believe that an updated AUMF is necessary. See
Cronogue, supra note 14, at 401–02; see also supra note 283.
363. Ten Years After the Authorization for Use of Military Force: Current Status of
Legal Authorities, Detention, and Prosecution in the War on Terror, Hearing Before the H.
Armed Servs. Comm., 112th Cong. 3 (2011) (statement of Professor Robert Chesney)
[hereinafter Chesney Testimony] (noting that “the substantive scope of the AUMF
nonetheless remains incompletely defined at both the organizational and individual levels”).
364. NDAA § 1021(d), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
365. See Barnes, supra note 18, at 82 (“[T]he AUMF’s current meaning is far from
clear.”); see also Waring, supra note 276, at 929 (“[T]he language in the AUMF . . . . left
unclear the scope of the President’s power to detain individuals.”).
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clear, fixed legal standards for detention. Relying on the AUMF allows
Congress to avoid including specific definitions and constraints on
executive detention. Congressional detention legislation must impose some
limits on executive power.
B. Provide Specific Definitions
The primary concern about providing more specificity in a detention
statute is that it will constrain the executive from effectively thwarting
terrorist threats.366 The proposed definitions below attempt to strike a
balance between the competing interests of clarity and deference to the
President. Courts currently evaluate the legality of individual detentions on
a case-by-case basis.367 They do not use rigid criteria but consider the
totality of the circumstances since they lack clear guidance from
Congress.368 A congressional detention statute with clear definitions and
standards will both guide and constrain judicial review. A statute with
specific definitions is also more likely to survive any potential
constitutional challenges.369 With specific definitions, Congress will no
longer need to rely on the AUMF or vague references to the international
law of war.
1. Defining Membership: The “Part of” Analysis
Most courts agree that it is lawful to detain an individual who is “part of”
Al Qaeda or the Taliban.370 Courts struggle, however, when asked to make
specific membership determinations. This is because there are many
different ways to be “part of” these groups, and it is difficult to provide an
exhaustive list of criteria.371 This Note’s proposed definition for “part of”
recognizes the flexibility necessary in membership determinations, while
still prioritizing certain important criteria that should be “red flags” for the
courts:
(1) The following facts create a strong presumption that an individual is a
“part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban: participation in the command structure
of the organization, fighting alongside or planning an act of violence with
other members, receiving training from the organization, or staying at an
affiliated guesthouse with the intent of training or fighting with the
organization.
(2) The facts listed above are not exhaustive, and other compelling
evidence may be used to prove membership. However, if none of the
facts listed above are present, it is likely that an individual is not a “part
of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban.

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 168, 173–74 and accompanying text.
See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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(3) An individual who is determined to be a “part of” Al Qaeda or the
Taliban can be detained regardless of the location of capture and without
any demonstrated connection to the attacks on September 11, 2001.

2. Abandoning “Substantial Support”
The term “substantial support” should be removed from any future
detention statute because it is confusing and unnecessary. The government
has consistently failed to provide a definition of “substantial” in court.372
Even on appeal to the Second Circuit in Hedges, the government’s new
definition of substantial is vague and barely applicable to unconventional
conflicts.373 Thus, the term “substantial support” adds little interpretive
value.
By abandoning the concept of substantial support, Congress can choose
between three courses of action. First, Congress can omit any mention of
support in the detention statute and eliminate support as an independent
detention category. The executive already has tools to deal with those who
support terrorism, including bringing criminal charges in federal court
under the material support statute374 or trial by military commission.375
Given these other options, it may be unnecessary to indefinitely detain
without trial those who only provide support to terrorist organizations.
Second, Congress can keep the concept of support in the statute, but not
as an independent predicate for detention. Under this option, if an
individual provides support to Al Qaeda or the Taliban, it can be used as
evidence to show that he was a “part of” these organizations.376 Third,
Congress can retain support as an independent detention predicate, but it
must provide a clear definition of the term and examples of what type of
support can subject an individual to detention. The material support statute
provides a useful baseline for the level of specificity required.377 The
statute should also include a scienter element, requiring that the support be
either knowing or intentional.378
This Note recommends the second option. Given that an individual
detained during the current conflict may be held for years or even
decades,379 it seems excessive to indefinitely detain those who only provide
peripheral support. Also, as mentioned above, the President has other tools
to deal with those who support terrorism. Thus, it is best to add a statement
to the definition of “part of” in the previous section that includes the
concept of support:
372. See supra notes 229, 306 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 309–10 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. The 2009 MCA authorizes trial by
military commission for those who “purposefully and materially supported hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners.” 10 U.S.C. § 948a(7)(B) (Supp. V 2011).
376. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 312–15 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 316–17 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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(4) An individual can be detained for providing knowing support to Al
Qaeda or the Taliban if the support is significant enough to demonstrate
that the individual is functionally a “part of” one of these organizations.

3. Defining “Associated Forces”
Extending detention authority to individuals who are members of
“associated forces” of Al Qaeda is essential for effectively combatting
terrorism. Al Qaeda is loosely organized and has many splinter groups that
help carry out its goals.380 From a national security perspective, it is
illogical to permit detention of Al Qaeda members but not members of Al
Qaeda affiliates. The term “associated forces,” however, requires further
definition. As Judge Forrest recognized, the term can be easily clarified by
specific guidance from Congress.381
On appeal to the Second Circuit in Hedges, the government has provided
a definition of associated forces that includes armed groups that fight
alongside Al Qaeda or the Taliban against the United States.382 This
definition is sufficiently clear and should alleviate any vagueness concerns,
although it may be overly limiting. This definition could be interpreted to
exclude groups that plan or coordinate terrorist activity with Al Qaeda
away from a traditional battlefield.
Thus, in addition to this definition, it might be useful for the government
to actually name specific terrorist organizations that are considered
“associated forces” of Al Qaeda. The Supreme Court recognized that the
number of officially designated terrorist organizations is finite.383 The
State Department maintains a list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs)
that is unclassified and available to the public.384 The President could flag
specific FTOs on this list as associated forces of Al Qaeda. This would
further reduce any ambiguity and also allow the President to extend
detention authority to terrorist organizations that are particularly dangerous.
Obviously, the list of associated forces would not be exhaustive385 and
would change over time. But it would at least provide notice that
membership in specific groups could subject an individual to indefinite
detention.

380. See supra note 232 and accompanying text; see also Chesney Testimony, supra note
363, at 4.
381. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
382. See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
383. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2728 (2010) (“There is,
and always has been, a limited number of those organizations designated by the Executive
Branch.”).
384. See Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T ST.
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
385. Based on the government’s definition, “associated forces” would still apply to other
armed groups that fight alongside Al Qaeda, even if they are not designated as FTOs.
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C. A First Amendment Savings Clause
As discussed in Part III.C, this Note does not focus on the First
Amendment issues raised in Hedges. However, like the material support
statute,386 a future congressional detention statute could include a First
Amendment savings clause in an attempt to alleviate any First Amendment
concerns. The savings clause would explicitly prohibit detention based
solely on protected First Amendment activities. If section 1021 had
included a savings clause, it likely would have prevented the plaintiffs in
Hedges from establishing standing. With a savings clause, the journalists
and activists could not have reasonably feared that they would be detained
solely for free speech activities.
Additionally, a future detention statute could include a clause that
prohibits detention based solely on independent advocacy.387 Thus, in
order to be detained, an individual would need to have some intentional
contact with Al Qaeda , the Taliban, or associated forces. This would
probably exclude, for example, the plaintiff in Hedges who founded
subversive websites.388 Merely posting content on the internet without
intentionally supporting terrorist organizations could not subject an
individual to detention if independent advocacy was excluded.389
D. A Clear Statement on Detention of U.S. Citizens
This Note does not take a position on the detention of American citizens.
However, Congress should take a position on the issue.390 In section 1021,
Congress stated that it was not changing existing law regarding the
detention of U.S. citizens.391 This is an abdication of Congress’s role in the
political process, particularly because the detention of American citizens is
controversial and existing law is unclear.392
The rejected Feinstein Amendment II to the 2013 NDAA was a step in
the right direction and an attempt to make a clear congressional statement
on the issue.393 Congress should go further than the Feinstein Amendment
and clearly state whether it believes that American citizens can be
indefinitely detained by the executive. Even though President Obama has
386. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
388. See Hedges v. Obama, No. 12 Civ. 331(KBF), 2012 WL 3999839, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 12, 2012).
389. This would not address the plaintiffs’ First Amendment associational concerns,
because they could still be detained for associating with terrorist groups, especially if it rose
to the level of membership.
390. See generally John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court demands a high level of
congressional clarity when dealing with statutes related to core constitutional values).
391. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. A plurality of the Supreme Court in
Hamdi declared that an American citizen could be detained as an enemy combatant, but the
legal landscape in this area is still uncertain.
393. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
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stated that he will not indefinitely detain American citizens,394 a future
President might change this policy. Congress needs to send a clear message
to the President about his authority to detain American citizens.
CONCLUSION
Congress has an important role in determining the scope of the
President’s war powers. This is particularly true in the area of executive
indefinite detention, where there is a high risk for abuse if left unchecked.
In section 1021 of the NDAA, Congress failed to define or limit the
President’s detention authority. Section 1021 repeats the executive’s
interpretation of detention authority verbatim, and it fails to clarify any
important terms. A new congressional detention statute is necessary to
provide clear and meaningful guidance to both the President and the courts.

394. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.

